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ABSTRACT 
Leaders in Conflict: 
Diefenbaker, Kennedy, and Canada's Response to the Cuban Missile Crisis 
Thesis under the direction of Roger Sarty, Ph.D., Professor of History. 
By Matthew Gurney 
While the Cuban Missile Crisis has received a tremendous amount of attention from 
American scholars, in Canada the historiography concerning the Crisis is quite limited, 
with few monographs devoted to it. Typically the Crisis might receive a few pages of 
attention, perhaps a chapter in a book concerned with other topics. This historiographical 
"blind spot" has allowed misconceptions concerning Canada's diplomatic and military 
participation in the Crisis to persist in this country's collective memory of the Crisis, 
which is a disservice not only to Canada's national heritage, but to the thousands of men 
and women who strove to prepare Canada for the possibility of thermonuclear war 
against the Soviet Union and its allies. 
Making use of the most recent document declassifications and all available secondary 
scholarship, this thesis examines the true nature of Canada's oft-overlooked contributions 
to continental security, and the increasingly hostile personal relationship between 
President John F. Kennedy and Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. Particular attention is 
paid to how understanding of these events has evolved with the release of once-classified 
materials over the nearly five decades since the Crisis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will examine the development of personal acrimony between President 
Kennedy and Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and how it affected Canada-US defence 
relations at a critical time in the Cold War. The Diefenbaker and Kennedy 
administrations coincided with a period of increasing confrontation between the western 
and Soviet blocs when, of necessity, the homeland defence forces of the two nations 
became much more closely interlocked. The agreements for emergency action were 
extraordinarily complex and, partly as a result of the differences between the two national 
leaders, still in the course of development when they were tested in October 1962 by the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. Played out over thirteen long days where mutually assured 
destruction seemed imminent and perhaps unavoidable, the Cuban Missile Crisis, ended 
successfully by desperate, secretive last minute negotiations, is recalled as perhaps the 
most dangerous moment of the nuclear age. By virtue of geography, Canada could not 
help but become involved. 
Though close friendship with the world's greatest military and economic power 
has brought Canada many significant benefits, it does occasionally put the country in the 
line of fire, whether that fire is metaphorical or literal. Never was this truer than during 
the Cold War's long thermonuclear standoff. Canada, an established member of the 
Western bloc, was not only a target of the Soviet Union on the basis of its alignment with 
her traditional democratic allies, but because of the country's close ties and historical 
bond with the primary member of the Western bloc, the United States. The two nations' 
armed forces worked together to defend the continent and the two economies were 
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interlinked, furthering the growth of both and the unsurpassed prosperity of Canadians 
and Americans alike. The close cooperation of the Second World War and the Cold War 
had begun - particularly in the defence and economic spheres - to tie together the two 
nations into a single supranational entity, albeit a rather disorganized one. 
Had there ever been an exchange of nuclear weapons, geopolitical boundaries 
would have been meaningless. In this nightmarish - thankfully unrealized - scenario, the 
missiles and bombers of both sides would have been flying north and south to reach their 
targets in the most efficient manner possible. Canada, and the state of Alaska, had the 
misfortune of being the shooting gallery in what would have been the world's most lethal 
gunfight. "Collateral damage" would have then referred to weapons capable of 
reproducing conditions over our cities and towns as hostile to human life as the surface of 
the sun, while leaving behind a cloud of drifting dust to poison the land and account for 
yet more collateral damage. Even in the unlikely event that the Soviet Union had chosen 
to spare Canada any direct attacks, and presuming that no warheads were exploded over 
Canada during the furious air battles a nuclear war would have unleashed, the Canadian 
population, strung as it is in a thin band along the American border, would have been 
condemned to a slower and perhaps crueler fate in the days and weeks that would have 
followed this nightmarish scenario. 
It is this shared vulnerability that most tightly bound Canadians and Americans to 
one another during the darkest days of the Cold War. Given the risks Canada and 
America faced together, the two leaders should have been capable of working closely 
together as professionals, if not friends. While there have been some close friendships 
between Canadian Prime Ministers and American Presidents, during the danger-fraught 
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days of the early 1960s, personal dislikes at the highest levels of both governments 
threatened to derail the close relationship at a time of maximum danger. 
President John F. Kennedy and Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, mutually 
distrustful and both pursuing what they felt was their country's genuine national interest, 
when confronted by the spectre of Soviet nuclear missiles in Communist Cuba, hesitated 
to apply the appropriate pressure to ensure that the balky bi-lateral agreements functioned 
as effectively as they could. In doing so, they jeopardized not only a strong, mutually 
beneficial alliance, but also the physical survival of their respective peoples, and perhaps 
even civilization itself. There are few things in history about which that can be said 
without being absurdly hyperbolic; the Cuban Missile Crisis' rapid escalation to the very 
brink of a nuclear war between the superpowers is certainly one of them. President 
Kennedy's headstrong confidence, perceived by Diefenbaker as arrogance, led the Prime 
Minister to delay Canada's move to a state of heightened military alert in lock-step with 
the United States. This left North America vulnerable to a surprise attack. Even worse 
was Canada's drawn out process of accepting nuclear weapons for use by the Royal 
Canadian Air Force, which greatly reduced the effectiveness of the country's primary air 
defences, a weakness that had a direct impact on U.S. security. 
The story of Canada's participation in American-dominated continental defence 
organizations is a long and complex one, and has been well studied by Canadian scholars, 
though largely ignored by non-Canadians. The Cuban Missile Crisis, the event which first 
put these arrangements to the test, has in contrast received lavish examination by scholars 
all across the globe. The story of Canada's modest but not insignificant role in 
continental defence has evolved with the passage of time and the release of once-
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classified documents. This thesis will examine how the gradual release of files and 
increasing willingness of now-elderly participants in the period to share their experience 
has reshaped our understanding of these eventful years. It is doubtful that the story of 
continental defence during the days before and during the Cuban Missile Crisis will ever 
be fully known, but in its own way, this thesis will highlight what is known about 
Canada's participation, with specific reference to the earliest monographs, the later, more 
in-depth analyses, and the most recent possible scholarship, benefiting from the 
continued release of once-classified documents. 
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HISTORIOGRAPHY 
The main source for primary documents for this thesis was the John F. Kennedy 
Presidential Library and Museum in Boston, Massachusetts. Holding the papers of 
President Kennedy's Administration and donated private collections, the Library is a 
treasure trove of documents concerning the relationship between Canada and the United 
States, and also between Diefenbaker and Kennedy. The boxes of material examined 
were primarily those concerning Canada specifically, held in both the National Security 
Files series, as well as the smaller Presidential Office Papers series. There was some 
degree of overlap between the two series, mostly concerning telegrams about Canada that 
dealt with issues of American national defence that required top-level review by either 
the President himself or his most senior advisors. Documents related to defence that were 
sent to the Oval Office would be filed in both the National Security and the Office Paper 
series. The documents cover the period from December 1960, after President Kennedy's 
electoral victory but before his Inauguration (therefore representing the work of his 
transition team) right up to the abrupt end of every file in the fall of 1963.' 
Also examined were the National Security Files for Cuba, and a box of files 
relating to the intelligence reports prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency on 
developments in Cuba and by the United States Intelligence Agency on foreign reaction 
to the 1962 crisis. The National Security files on Cuba include minutes of the meetings of 
President Kennedy's ad hoc "ExComm" group of top advisors, which while interesting to 
read, have been extraordinarily well covered by several recent monographs and document 
All papers, even those related to Kennedy himself, dated past his assassination on 22 November 1963, are 
property of the Johnson Library. 
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collections, released since the public was in 1996 given access to the so-called "Kennedy 
Tapes." These tapes are audio recordings of conversations amongst the members of 
ExComm, including President Kennedy, when he was present. The recent Averting the 
Final Failure: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings provides a 
narrative of events and scholarly commentary on those heard on the tapes, but also 
includes quotations of long passages of transcripts taken directly from them.2 This and 
other published versions of the transcriptions were more useful than the frayed, 
deteriorating records themselves.3 
The online records of the State Department's "Documents on the Foreign 
Relations of the United States" proved surprisingly unhelpful. FRUS, typically a treasure 
trove of information, in this case served only to repeatedly elaborate upon information 
already covered in the JFK Library collections. There are almost 400 relevant documents 
contained within FRUS's series on the Crisis, and while reading them it became apparent 
that many of the most interesting JFK Library documents are essentially these FRUS 
pieces, stripped of all unnecessary verbiage and reduced to the bare essential facts. The 
explanation is simple - many of the bureaucrats and diplomats writing the FRUS 
documents had the time necessary to write witty and detailed memos, while Kennedy's 
inner circle had just enough time to furiously read through them and compile reports on 
the content. The FRUS documents are worth reading for context, but in the sense of 
defining the historiography and appreciating Canada's involvement, the JFK Library 
2 . . . 
Sheldon M. Stern, Averting the Final Failure: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis 
Meetings. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
3 While I did not get access to the original documents themselves, of course, I was using the Kennedy 
Library's official copies of them. For obvious reasons, they would be a top draw, and this is made clear by 
the low quality of the photocopies available. Having no doubt been worn out and recopied many times, 
many of the documents suffer from severe "photocopier burn" and in some cases were bordering on being 
completely unreadable. 
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documents were much more helpful. 
Also most helpful was a collection of 85 documents released by the National 
Security Archive, covering all aspects of the Crisis, including State Department 
telegrams, ExComm minutes, intelligence and military reports, and most importantly, 
both of Khrushchev's letters to President Kennedy that played such a critical role in first 
deepening and then ultimately resolving the Crisis. Many of these documents were 
plucked directly from FRUS, and represented the most tersely informative documents 
that could be found, free of unnecessary personal commentary and editorializing, 
something America's diplomats seemed alarmingly prone to. 
Most of the documents collected for this paper were either fully declassified or 
only lightly redacted. A representative example is a memo of conversation between 
Livingston Merchant, the former American ambassador to Canada, sent to Ottawa as 
Kennedy's personal emissary on the eve of his address to the world announcing his 
quarantine of Cuba. The memo is intact in virtually its entirety, except that the name of 
the United States intelligence officer sent with Merchant to deliver the briefing has been 
redacted. Similar inconsequential redactions can be found in some of the other 
documents, and in many cases related files that have subsequently been released have 
supplied the missing information. Moreover, an informed reader can glean at least the 
essential elements of what was being discussed with only the slightest of intuitive 
leaping. Examples include documents on the US-Canadian defence relationship that read 
along the lines of, "In time of [deleted] the Canadian government has granted permission 
for SAC [deleted] carrying [deleted] to overfly their territory." It is not difficult to 
conclude that this document is referring to bombers, carrying nuclear weapons, during 
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times of war. Names of bases, personnel, and specific weapons systems are redacted, but 
in the majority of instances, these deletions do not reduce the usefulness of the document. 
One significant exception to the generally unobtrusive redaction was a series of 
documents relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the United States military. Four entire 
boxes were delivered in response to the writer's request. This was exciting, as Library 
staff stated that these boxes had only very recently been made "open" to the public and 
that the writer was among the first to examine them. Upon opening it, it became clear that 
the archivist's definition of "open" was somewhat different than the one the layperson 
might be forgiven for assuming: while the boxes themselves had been opened to the 
public, each of them contained a list stating, "The following documents have been 
removed by order of the Defense Department" followed by a long column of file 
headings. The boxes contained only these sheets. 
Canadian government documents were essential to provide a framework for the 
assessment of the more numerous US documents. In particular, the Documents on 
Canadian External Relations series of the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade provided valuable material regarding Canada's relations with its allies 
and particularly Canada's evolving, often muddled position on nuclear weapons. While 
only the volumes to 1959 have been published, these provide essential context on the 
development of US-Canadian military relations. Inspection of personal papers was at 
times complicated by issues of ownership and temporary removal of documents from 
circulation (see discussion of Minister Harkness below). 
There is surprisingly little historiography devoted to the Canadian role in the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. Many of the sources that are available touch on it only tangentially; 
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for example, political surveys of the turbulent period of Canadian federal governance 
during the early 1960s touch on the Crisis and divisions it brought forth within the 
Progressive Conservative Party of Diefenbaker. Works focused on the Liberal Party or 
upon Lester B. Pearson himself also relate to the Crisis from that angle, and how it helped 
improve Liberal fortunes in the next Canadian federal election. Other works are surveys 
of Canadian military history and our complex relationship with weapons of mass 
destruction. While there are some works that focus on the Crisis, such as Peter Haydon's 
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered4 or Knowlton 
Nash's Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended Border5, in 
the main, much of the Canadian historiography for this paper was gleaned by parsing 
works written on other topics. 
The works on politics came in two distinct waves of scholarship. The first wave, 
published during the 1960s, can best be described as contemporary narratives and 
analysis of Diefenbaker's time as Prime Minister. These books vary in their quality and 
continued usefulness. Given the highly classified nature of the Cuban Missile Crisis' 
innermost decision-making, and the determined efforts by both Washington6 and 
Moscow to keep the details of the eventual resolution secret, the earliest works of 
Canadian scholarship tend to grope in the dark. In some cases, they report as fact what 
has since been revealed to have been fiction, particularly as regards Washington's anger 
at Ottawa's lackluster response to the Crisis, which was concealed from the public so as 
4 
Peter Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered (Toronto: The 
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993). 
Knowlton Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended Border. (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 1990). 
An excellent example of the extent of the efforts to mislead is found in Robert Kennedy's monograph 
Thirteen Days. His description of how the Crisis ended bears little resemblance to the reality. 
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to present the Soviets with at least the appearance of a united front. 
Perhaps the earliest work to make detailed reference to the Cuban Missile Crisis is 
Peter C. Newman's Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years.7 Published in 1963, one 
year after the Crisis, the work is practically a real-time assessment of Diefenbaker as 
Prime Minister. Given Newman's critical tone, it might be more aptly referred to as an 
autopsy. It contains no bibliography and only a very few notes, usually offering further 
narrative or a personal aside, rather than any form of scholarly notation. It must have 
been literally rushed to the presses in order to hit the bookstore shelves while still timely, 
and while this can be understood, it certainly diminishes its utility. It is best used not as a 
source for study, but as a tool which helps to ground the reader in the charged emotions 
and bitter personal rivalries of the early 1960s, and to shed some light on how 
Diefenbaker was viewed by both friend and foe. In 1963, he still had plenty of both. 
While Newman stresses in his introduction that he has not set out to write the 
final word on Diefenbaker, or to provide a comprehensive biography of the man's life, he 
certainly does not pull his punches when addressing what the author considered to be 
Diefenbaker's many failings as a leader and a politician. Diefenbaker, argued Newman, 
was a man who believed his own good press, who became "self-charmed" and began to 
believe that what was best for Diefenbaker was automatically what was best for Canada. 
While only 20 pages are devoted to the Cuban Missile Crisis and Canada's tortuously 
slow process of accepting nuclear weapons, these 20 pages reflect the immediate reaction 
of the Canadian intelligentsia to Diefenbaker's handling of the Crisis. Newman provides 
devastating criticisms of Diefenbaker, portraying him as deer caught in the headlights of 
Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963). 
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history, totally unable to respond to the pressures of a fast-developing Crisis. Later 
scholarship has somewhat redeemed the Prime Minister, but Newman's early work 
certainly helped set the stage for the gradual collapse of Diefenbaker's political legacy. 
Broadly similar, if different in tone, is Thomas Van Dusen's The Chief, published 
in 1968.8 Van Dusen was both a personal friend and political confidante of the Prime 
Minister, and thus is a rather more biased source than most. All the same, it is interesting 
to note the degree that Van Dusen does not refute Newman's critical assessment. From 
Van Dusen, we get a more balanced portrayal of Diefenbaker as a sharply intelligent man 
being pulled in too many directions at once. The book, almost 400 pages long, lacks an 
overall thesis, being more a narrative of Van Dusen's time in Ottawa and his relationship 
with the Prime Minister. While a fine piece of writing, it is not a particularly good piece 
of scholarship, as it is totally lacking in notes, a bibliography, or even an index. 
The Chief is not without merit, as it provides fascinating insight into the world of 
Ottawa politics during the Diefenbaker years, which provides useful background context 
for understanding the Crisis as just one among many disasters which threatened to upset 
Diefenbaker's plans for the country and the fragile balance of power in his minority 
parliament. All the same, the lack of even basic scholarly guideposts — especially an 
index — make this work frustrating to historians. When one does track down the sections 
on the Crisis, they are glib and poorly detailed, offering only the bland cover stories 
established after the Crisis, and perpetuated by those like Bobby Kennedy (see note 
above). Whether or not Van Dusen even knew he was propagating a myth is unknown; it 
is entirely plausible that he truly believed that Crisis had ended exactly as was reported. If 
Thomas Van Dusen, The Chief (Toronto: McGraw Hill, 1968). 
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he knew more, even about how the Prime Minister viewed the situation, The Chief does 
not make such clear. 
The memoirs of both John Diefenbaker and Lester Pearson provided insight into 
what was going on inside the minds of the two men during the Crisis and the events 
before and after it. Both benefit from direct access to their own personal papers, as well 
as the willingness of their colleagues to contribute papers and recollections, but of course 
suffer from the bias inherent to memoirs. 
Of the two, Pearson's memoir, Mike,9 is the more balanced, as he seems willing to 
offer a more nuanced perspective on the Canadian government's response to the Crisis. 
While both are careful to hew closely to the established narrative (both memoirs were 
published in the 1970s, and therefore predate the most revealing archival 
declassifications), Pearson's work offers insight into a disastrous address to the House 
given by Diefenbaker the night of Kennedy's famous "Full retaliatory response" speech, 
wherein he suggests that Diefenbaker was simply fatigued and under pressure, and 
misspoke.10 
Diefenbaker's memoir, on the other hand, while witty and highly readable, is 
transparently a final word against his detractors and an attempt to redeem his battered 
legacy. He seeks to avoid overtly criticizing President Kennedy, but refuses to take any 
responsibility for Canada's hesitant response, and seems mystified that anyone would feel 
otherwise. The words convey tremendous satisfaction with his career, but the insecurity 
9 
Lester B. Pearson, Mike. Vol. II (Toronto: Signet Books, 1975). The volume consulted was the second of 
three. Pearson died midway through its completion, leaving it in the hands of his editors to complete. The 
third volume was a collection of essays, diaries, and interviews given, organized as best as possible by the 
editors. 
In the address, it seemed as though Diefenbaker was questioning the President's word. This diplomatic 
blunder is a central theme in all the literature around Diefenbaker during the Crisis, and is explained 
perhaps most effectively by later works. 
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for which he was so well known is clearly between the lines. One Canada is 
Diefenbaker's last grasp at a legacy, and it is clear that he knew that.' ' 
After a long period where the scholarly work was focused on the military, not the 
political, a glut of document declassifications in the late 1980s, 25 years after the Crisis 
ended, led to two new major works of relevant Canadian political history. These works, 
as well as numerous books relating specifically to the military aspects of Canada's Crisis 
participation, can be said to constitute the second major wave of scholarship. The 
biography Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker, written by Denis 
Smith and published in 1995, was the most recent reputable scholarly work available.12 It 
made heavy use of all the available archives: the Canadian National Archives in Ottawa, 
the Diefenbaker Centre in Saskatoon, and the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in 
Boston. Smith also had access to a great number of privately-lent document collections, 
primarily from members of Diefenbaker's cabinet, and three decades of secondary 
scholarship, allowing this to be a much fuller examination of the career of Diefenbaker 
than had before been possible. Indeed, in many ways, this is the complete biography of 
Diefenbaker that Peter Newman took pains to point out that he was not seeking to write 
in 1963. 
In contrast to the earlier works, Newman's included, Smith provides a balanced, 
sympathetic portrayal of Diefenbaker, stating that he was an unusually skilled populist 
politician whose strong leadership and vision helped to establish the Progressive 
Conservative Party's strength in Western Canada. Be that as it may, the book is also 
John G. Diefenbaker, One Canada. Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker: The 
Tumultuous Years. 1962 to 1967. (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1977). 
12 
Denis Smith, Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker (Toronto: MacFarlane, Walter, 
& Ross, 1995). 
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highly critical of Diefenbaker personally, specifically, it calls him to task for his erratic 
behaviour, his hesitancy and distrustfulness, all issues that paralyzed his ability to lead 
the country during the turbulent 1960s. Indeed, no doubt President Kennedy would have 
agreed with Smith's overall conclusion: Diefenbaker was a proud Canadian and a capable 
politician who brought his promising and generally successful career in politics to ruin by 
indulging the worst of his personal traits. 
Thomas Van Dusen was not the only confidant of Diefenbaker to pen a volume. 
H. Basil Robinson, a close aide and friend of the Prime Minister, wrote Diefenbaker's 
1 "\ 
World in 1989. This work is a thorough examination of the period of Diefenbaker's 
leadership, and is not always flattering in its portrayal of the Prime Minister. While not 
embittered, Robinson's frustration with Diefenbaker, even long after the latter's death, is 
apparent in the chapters dealing with the Kennedy Administration and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis specifically. Robinson's tome is particularly useful as regards the so-called 
"Rostow Memorandum", an American document forgotten after a meeting between 
Kennedy and Diefenbaker that the Prime Minister kept in his own possession, a 
staggering breach of diplomatic etiquette. Robinson was uniquely placed to look upon 
Diefenbaker's machinations with unease and eventually, outright alarm. While Robinson 
consulted essentially the same archival and personally lent document collections as 
Smith, he also benefited from the use of his own diary, which he quotes at length 
throughout the book. Indeed, the diary entries provide an unconventional if welcome 
narrative framework for the book, with an entry from a given day leading into detailed 
discussion of what followed, and why it was significant. 
13 
H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs. (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1989). 
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An important work in furthering Canada's Cold War historiography is Knowlton 
Nash's Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended Border 
(1990). In brisk, readable, often humourous prose, Nash explores the personal 
relationship between the Prime Minister and the President, and how hard those beneath 
them had to struggle just to sustain the alliance in the moment of maximum tension. Nash 
knew both men personally, and had access to numerous persons who had served in high 
placed positions on both sides of the borders. Nash utilized his extensive personal 
contacts to interview many of these individuals, and made heavy use of the JFK 
Presidential Library, the Diefenbaker Centre, the National Archives of both nations, and 
numerous secondary sources. His thesis — that Kennedy's ignorance of Canada galled 
the anti-American Diefenbaker, who responded with stubborn bluster at inopportune 
times — is well argued and supported. 
Nash also provides some of the best overall coverage of the Rostow 
Memorandum debacle. It is ironic that this is so, since he narrowly missed being able to 
access the documents himself; they were opened to the public shortly after his work was 
published. Even so, through personal interviews and exhaustive searches of all available 
information, Nash was able to assemble an accurate picture of this embarrassing affair, 
even without direct access to the documents. 
Canadian defence historiography has followed a broadly similar cycle: early 
writings doing their best to make sense of a confusing situation from public documents 
often designed to conceal unpleasant facts, followed by a surge of new scholarship in the 
1980s and early 1990s as archives were opened and participants became more willing to 
speak on the record to historians and journalists. Two early works covered Canadian 
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military and foreign policy during that decade. John McLin's Canada's Changing Defence 
Policy. 1957-1963 (1967) offers a highly detailed, technical examination of Canadian 
defence policy and the weapons systems acquired to implement them.14 Drawing upon 
debates, newspaper records, off-the-record interviews of indeterminable accuracy, and 
public-domain information concerning weapons and hardware, McLin does his best to 
assemble a picture of the rapid transformations the Canadian armed forces were 
undergoing while Diefenbaker was Prime Minister. It contains chapters not only on the 
Canadian military's response to the Missile Crisis, but also a highly detailed account of 
Canada's hesitant acquisition of nuclear warheads. 
While McLin's book is more focused on building a narrative than analyzing the 
causes, it is notable that he remarks upon some of the increasingly confusing and 
contradictory information coming out in the late 1960s about how cooperative Canada 
truly had been during the Crisis. Admitting that much of the necessary information was 
unavailable and would be for some time, McLin comments on the "rumours" that the 
Canadian government withheld permission to commence pre-arranged mutual defence 
arrangements that the Pentagon had taken for granted when readying American defences. 
McLin, interestingly, expresses doubt that such is the case, and suggests that the 
American officers he spoke with (off the record) were either uninformed or overly 
influenced by inflammatory partisan rhetoric by journalists and politicians on both sides 
of the border. McLin also references for the first time something that has since become 
the source of considerable speculation but never been resolved — whether or not, in the 
heat of the Crisis, some small number of nuclear weapons were indeed given to the 
John McLin, Canada's Changing Defence Policy. 1957-1963 (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1967). 
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Canadian military. Although McLin's suspicions that Canada did receive warheads are 
frequently cited in later works, there is little hope of ever discovering whether this is a 
leaked secret or a myth. 
The second major scholarly to appear in the 1960s is Peyton Lyon's Canada in 
World Affairs, 1961-63.15 This hefty volume is a part of the "Canada in World Affairs" 
series sponsored by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Like McLin's work, it 
offers detailed analysis, but more so on the Crisis than the earlier debates about the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons. It is heavily reliant upon sources now known to have 
H been manipulated: records of debate, public statements and media reports. Published in 
1968, this work begins to question the accepted narrative, paving the way for research 
that would not follow for two decades. 
Lyon questions the official version of how well Canada and the United States 
cooperated during the Crisis, and is the first to unravel one of the bleaker truths of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis: Canada turned down very few requests from the United States 
because the Americans knew better than to ask. Quoting an unnamed American 
diplomatic official, Lyon suggests that Washington "didn't ask for much" because they 
had been quietly warned by sympathetic Canadian military officials that the government 
was so deadlocked than any requests would be turned down. Despite being critical of the 
slowness of Canada's response, Lyon is also the first to suggest that the issue was not 
necessarily whether or not Canada should have responded differently, but whether or not 
the United States ever would have deigned to consult us more fully. A fascinating point, 
Lyon is the first to raise it, bringing a more nuanced approach to the Crisis, and 
Peyton Lyon, Canada in World Affairs. 1961-63 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968). 
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advancing the historiographic narrative considerably. 
As archives were opened in the late 1980s, Canadian military and foreign policy 
historians were quick to react. Jack Granatstein summarized in a chapter in Kennedy's 
Quest for Victory (1989) the numerous entanglements between the US and Canadian 
militaries and how Diefenbaker's hesitation to honour prior agreements led to a strong, 
somewhat impolitic response by the American diplomatic machines in both Washington 
and Ottawa.16 
The chapter highlights a key issue — the Canadian Minister of National Defence, 
Douglas Harkness, did his best to quietly put the Canadian military on maximum possible 
alert, without the authorization of the Prime Minister. Granatstein's chapter relies heavily 
upon already published secondary sources and publicly available interviews, but this 
discussion of Harkness' actions quickly became a focal point of all subsequent Canadian 
historiography. An example is a chapter in Canadian Foreign Policy by Jocelyn Ghent-
Mallet, that expands on the effect of Harkness' raising of the alert: the Canadian military 
readied itself for battle, but the lack of an official statement from Ottawa had the effect 
communicating a lack of support to Washington. Nash and Smith also cover this topic in 
detail. 
Douglas Harkness has become something of an object of torment to this writer. 
His document collections are formidable, and are entrusted to the Canadian National 
Archives. As Canada's leading voice on defence matters during the period under study, 
Jack Granatstein, "When Push Came to Shove: Canada and the United States." Kennedy's Quest for 
Victory. Thomas G. Patterson, ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). Jack Granatstein has written 
several books dealing with at least aspects of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the main, however, those books 
touch upon the Crisis only in reference to other topics, or examine it from an extremely dry "operational 
perspective" of military history. This article, in contrast, while still engaging directly with the relevant 
material, did so concisely, engagingly, and provided the same information and insight. 
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Harkness' personal papers and notes would have been invaluable, and have mostly been 
declassified. Regrettably, the collection has been withdrawn from circulation, for 
restoration and eventual digitalization, so that scholars from around the world can browse 
the documents and download the ones that suit their fancy. While this will be a boon for 
future students and historians, it had the effect of taking the entire collection out of play 
right when it would have been most helpful for this paper. While the same issues are 
adequately explored in the secondary sources, the missed opportunity is most 
unfortunate. A doctoral thesis by Patricia I. McMahon, The Politics of Canada's Nuclear 
Policy, 1957-1963, was examined due to its heavy use of the Harkness Papers.17 While 
they are frequently cited in the paper, they are focused predominantly on not the politics 
relevant to this paper, but on purely domestic issues, including various disarmament 
groups and inter-party bickering for both the Conservatives and the Liberals, and are thus 
not directly relevant to the topic at hand. 
The declassification of documents related to nuclear warfare and continental air 
I Q 
defence accelerated after the end of the Cold War. This led to another boom in 
scholarship, constituting a third wave of Canadian historiography concerning the nation's 
military participation in the Crisis. Joseph Jockel's works No Boundaries Upstairs: 
Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence19 (1987) and 
his recent Canada in NORAD (2007) provided helpful insight into the evolving nature 
and functional realities of the Canadian and American joint command.20 The former title, 
l7Patricia D. McMahon, "The Politics of Canada's Nuclear Policy, 1957-1963." (PhD thesis, University of 
Toronto, 1999) 
Given the anxieties of a post-9-11 world, it is likely that the flow of documents related to continental air 
defence will soon slow to a trickle. 
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based largely on documents that became available at the end of the 1980s, is a tightly 
focused account of the origin of integrated US-Canadian continental air defence. He 
concludes that even while the Canadian government wrung its hands over sovereignty 
concerns, the military was eager to work as closely with the Americans as possible, and 
felt that such cooperation was a benefit to Canadian sovereignty, not a threat. The more 
recent work explores, using NORAD's own archives and papers recently released by the 
Canadian Department of National Defence, how NORAD was viewed by both the 
military and the respective national governments. The conclusion, that the military 
thought it was a logical, useful apparatus, while the governments bogged down the whole 
operation with unhelpful politics, is no surprise, and fits with the established 
historiography of the Crisis. 
Learning to Love the Bomb (2007), by Sean Maloney, covers the same topics in 
much greater depth. Maloney has constructed a highly readable history of Canada's 
agonizingly slow adoption of nuclear weapons, which while too prolonged to please the 
Americans, proceeded much faster behind the scenes than most Canadians would have 
been aware. With a daunting bibliography covering a range of archives and military 
record holdings across the English-speaking world, as well as a long list of interviews, 
Maloney's work explores whether or not Canada was a staunch ally of the United States, 
something that the earlier works had always taken as a given, even while conceding that 
Diefenbaker's personal dislike of Kennedy did factor in the end result. Maloney argues 
instead that the Canadian government attempted to have it both ways — insisting on 
International Relations & the Queen's Defence Management Program by McGill-Queen's University Press, 
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Canada's need and right to acquire nuclear weapons from the US, but only on Canadian 
terms. This bold assertion may have merit, but certainly not during the period of the 
Missile Crisis, when Canada's lack of atomic ammunition backfired on Ottawa, and was 
partially responsible for the fall of Diefenbaker's government. 
Avoiding Armageddon (2002) by Andrew Richter studies the same issues and the 
same period, but focuses on Canadian nuclear weapons doctrine, rather than the political 
battles over their acquisition and the operational details of their deployment.22 While of 
limited use in assessing the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was most helpful in establishing how 
the Canadian government — particularly senior officials — viewed nuclear weapons, as 
compared to the case-by-case arguments concerning specific missiles or planes more 
often discussed in the literature. Richter concludes that the government was in agreement 
that nuclear weapons were not simply another battlefield tool, but the ultimate, final 
weapon of last resort. The military wanted them badly, so as to gain influence within the 
western alliance, not just to have the means for keeping the Soviets out of Canadian 
airspace. At the same time the Department of External Affairs, led in 1959-63 by a 
disarmament crusader, the minister Howard Green, wanted Canada to spearhead the 
charge against nuclear arms. Richter richly narrates the tug of war between ministers 
Harkness and Green that so hobbled the chronically insecure Diefenbaker leading up to 
and during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Diefenbaker, Richter argues, was a man who wished 
all to love him, and could not keep the Americans, the military, and External Affairs 
happy all at the same time. In the end, these conflicting impulses left him wracked with 
self-doubt and indecision. 
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It would be no exaggeration to refer to the available scholarship regarding the 
abbreviated Presidency of John F. Kennedy as mammoth. Historians and biographers 
the world over have been fascinated by the entire Kennedy family, and especially the 
"Camelot" of his administration, since the moment Kennedy entered office. In these 
many and varied works, Canada is seldom mentioned, if at all. In a typical case, Canada 
might receive a mention as being one of the allied countries to which Kennedy sent an 
emissary before announcing the Crisis to the world. Perhaps Prime Minister Diefenbaker 
would warrant a mention by name in such a paragraph, but perhaps not. A rare few 
mention continental defence, but most ignore Canada entirely. To most American 
historians, the Missile Crisis was a battle between Moscow and Washington, with Cuba 
stumbling between the superpowers, little more than an irritant. And Canada merits even 
less study. Sobering stuff for Canadian nationalists to ponder. 
The Crisis Years (1991) is a broad overview of the personal relationship between 
Khrushchev and Kennedy and how they both plotted and maneuvered against each other 
so as to drive their agendas forward.24 Covering not only the Missile Crisis but also other 
Cold War hotspots such as Indo-China, Berlin, and the Latin American states other than 
Cuba, the work is useful in providing a means to recall that the Cuban Missile Crisis, as 
frightening and significant as it inarguably was, was but one gambit among many 
between the leaders. 
Ironically, this writer took refuge in a local library during noisy renovations to his home while working 
on this very thesis, and had been comfortably ensconced in a small corner of the library for several hours 
reading a biography on Kennedy before he realized that the book stacks around him were almost entirely 
devoted to books on Kennedy and his family, particularly his wife Jackie. The former First Lady's personal 
fashion choices are seemingly a topic of endless fascination for the patrons of the Richmond Hill Central 
Public Library. 
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Similar is the monograph Kennedy's Wars (2000), by Lawrence Freedman, which 
addresses Cold War confrontations between the superpowers not chronologically, but 
geographically, addressing each of the potential flashpoints — Vietnam, Berlin, Cuba — 
in turn, giving full attention to each in a self-contained chapter.25 Exhaustively researched 
and superbly organized, it provides the reader with an excellent overview of the many 
crises that beset the President during the Cold War, and the factors that led to each. 
Former Executive editor of The New York Times and Pulitzer Prize winner Max 
Frankel's High Noon in the Cold War, published in 2005, is a short, highly readable 
summary of the Crisis and its aftermath. It stands apart from the rest because it focuses 
on some of the lesser-known personalities that allowed the Crisis to be successfully 
resolved; rather than viewing the Crisis purely as a confrontation between Kennedy and 
Khrushchev, it discusses the diligent work of the various ambassadors and advisors to 
both leaders who helped to defuse the Crisis. 
Also vital to the preparation of a coherent thesis on the subject of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis is a due appreciation for the technical and strategic issues that caused and 
shaped it. While technical details of the specific missiles and other weapons systems can 
be found readily online, for proper discussion of the overall strategic situation and the 
role military necessity played in determining political policy is vital. Examinations of the 
particular strategic and tactical aspects of the Crisis are numerous, and discussion of 
overall theories and strategies for nuclear warfare are also abundant. While very useful in 
immersing oneself into the mindset of a Cold War strategist or tactician, it should be 
25 
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recognized that the end of the Cold War essentially ended the scholarly dialogue on 
nuclear weapons and warfare until very recent post-9-11 anxieties resulted in a return to 
the prospects for nuclear attacks — of dramatically diminished scale — upon North 
American cities. While academically sound, it cannot be denied that virtually all available 
scholarship on nuclear warfare dates back to the 1980s, at the most recent. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that the militaries of all nuclear states jealously guard their 
nuclear secrets.27 
All the same, there is some useful scholarship available. Soviet Nuclear Strategy 
(1988) provides a fascinating look inside the Soviet Union's Strategic Rocket Forces as 
well as Soviet long-range strategic bombers as they struggled to overcome enormous 
American technical advantages with a combination of misdirection and rushed 
technological developments. Knowing that they were far behind, the Soviet Union 
sought to create the maximum possible appearance of strength while maintaining large, 
intimidating conventional armies on NATO's doorstep to counter-balance the American 
nuclear arsenal. As this work capably illustrates, it was only during the reign of 
Khrushchev that the nuclear weapons delivery systems of the Soviet Union had matured 
to the point where the size of the Red Army could safely begin to be reduced from a level 
near its strength at the end of the Second World War. 
Other books explore the impact of fears of nuclear war upon the American 
population during the Missile Crisis. David Detzer's excellent if somewhat dated 
27 
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monograph The Brink discusses how many in Washington's military and political elite 
viewed the prospect of impending doom, namely, with bleak resignation and gallows 
humour. The far more recent Awaiting Armageddon takes a somewhat more off-beat 
view of the crisis, recounting with tongue-in-cheek humour how the American public 
responded to the threat of instant annihilation: supermarkets saw their supplies of canned 
goods wiped out, gun stores were emptied of firearms and ammunition so that the 
survivors could fight over whatever meager resources remained after a nuclear holocaust, 
and young women and girls were suddenly confronted with a new approach to seduction: 
"Do you want to die a virgin?"30 While taking a somewhat lighter view of the Crisis than 
is the scholarly norm, Awaiting Armageddon still provides fascinating insight into how 
people reacted to the very real chance that total nuclear war was just around the corner. 
The rather more serious and measured response of the United States military to 
the Crisis, discussing both its preparations for nuclear war with the Soviet Union and a 
possible invasion of Cuba, is provided by the highly interesting DEFCON-2, a detailed 
technical study of all military aspects of the Crisis.31 Published in 2006, it benefits from 
recent declassifications, and discusses at length two particular instances in which the 
Crisis almost escalated to war accidentally: the first, when a harried Soviet submarine 
commander ordered a nuclear torpedo readied for launch against the United States Navy 
destroyer which was stalking him, and later in the Crisis, when Soviet commanders in 
Cuba asked permission to open fire on American aircraft if they approached the missile 
29 
David Detzer, The Brink: Cuban Missile Crisis. 1962 (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Publishers, 
1979). 
Alice L. George, Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2003). 
31 
Norman Polmar, DEFCON-2: Standing on the Brink of Nuclear War During the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2006). 
25 
sites to photograph them, a step Kennedy had ordered. Perhaps indicative of the regard in 
which Canada is held, the only Canadian reference in the index is to Diefenbaker himself, 
and his sole citation is inaccurate, off by several pages. This is a potent demonstration of 
just how little credit Canada receives (rightly or wrongly) for its conduct during the 
Crisis. 
26 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT - THE COLD WAR BEGINS 
The initial phases of the Cold War found the West at a serious disadvantage. The Second 
World War had destroyed the entire European balance of power. The traditional Great 
Powers had been left in ruins. This left Europe dominated by non-Europeans.32 Millions 
of Soviet troops were thrust deep into Central Europe.33 The Americans could no longer 
ignore European security, a tactic historian Thomas Parrish termed staying "hidden 
behind British skirts."34 
Harry Truman, newly elevated to the American presidency and a staunch fiscal 
conservative, was not willing to spend money on a massive army to match the Soviets.35 
The American Army had only two divisions at full strength, and only one in Europe.36 
The various Western European states possessed their own militaries, but these troops 
were recent conscripts, trained and armed poorly, serving bankrupt, demoralized states.37 
Western deterrence therefore hinged upon America's atomic monopoly. Sadly, the United 
States Army Air Force (later the United States Air Force) was plagued by manpower 
shortages and outdated equipment, and would have been unable to drop more than a 
small handful of atomic bombs onto the Soviet Union.38 
The Soviets were quick to test their democratic neighbours. In 1948, they broke 
their pledge to permit free elections in Central Europe, and installed a communist 
32 
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government in Czechoslovakia. They sought to restrict Allied access to West Berlin, 
forcing the Allies to supply the city entirely by air.40 After more than fourteen fruitless 
months, the Blockade was suspended on 12 May 1949.41 
The Soviet Union tested an atomic bomb on August 29th, 1949.42 The West was 
stunned, and unprepared.43 The American Army was down to a mere half-million 
soldiers.44 The British had cut back to Depression-era force levels.45 The Canadian 
military had all but evaporated back into its pre-war insignificance.46 Motivated by the 
Soviet bomb, the Western European allies joined with Canada and the United States in 
signing the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.47 President Truman, now fully aware of the 
need for robust military spending, approved NSC-68, a document prepared for him by his 
National Security Council calling for a dramatically increased American military 
strength.48 This sense of urgency was heightened after Soviet-backed North Korea 
invaded the western-aligned South in 1950. The Allied forces, despite early reversals, 
were able to contain the communist forces even after the Chinese committed millions of 
men, and did so without using atomic weapons, despite the very public suggestions of 
American General Douglas MacArthur to do exactly that.49 
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Harry Truman's successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, was disillusioned by the back-
and-forth ground campaigns of Korea, and uninterested in burdening the American 
taxpayer with the enormous cost of fielding a massive American army.50 His "New 
Look" policy foresaw American conventional weapons being supplanted by the threat of 
devastating nuclear attack, a deterrent he considered as real a threat for much less money. 
Eisenhower, himself a firm believer in the power of strategic bombing, established 
America's defence policy as one of "massive retaliation." As laid out by NSC-162/2, the 
defence policy of his Administration commented: 
The risk of Soviet aggression will be minimized by maintaining a strong 
security posture, with emphasis on adequate offensive retaliatory strength 
and defensive strength. This must be based on massive atomic 
capability... 
Eisenhower, despite being mindful of the need to stand up to the Soviets, was reluctant to 
spend on expensive military programs he did not consider absolutely vital. In a speech on 
April 16th, 1953, delivered to the Society of Newspaper Editors, he described military 
spending as "a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are 
not clothed."52 Military spending would be minimized, and what spending there was 
would go towards nuclear weapons. 
This left the American military curiously impotent in other situations. The cash-
starved Army was not ready for war against the Soviet Union.53 When the Soviet Union 
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forcibly crushed the Hungarian uprising of 1956, America had two policy options: issue a 
diplomatic protest, or utterly destroy the Soviets.54 Eisenhower grasped this, and 
commented that in a modern war, America had to be prepared to "push its whole stack of 
chips into the pot."55 This was a policy of "total war" taken to its furthest extreme. 
The Soviet Union, while still maintaining a large army, had begun to develop a 
long-range bombing force of its own. While possessed of barely a sixth of America's 
firepower it still represented the beginning of a viable nuclear threat to the American 
homeland.5 America began a feverish program of preparing the world's most 
comprehensive air defence network to counter this threat, in close cooperation with their 
Canadian allies. The details of these joint measures will be returned to at length later. 
The Soviets, however, changed the nature of the game in 1957, when they 
shocked the world by test firing a missile capable of carrying a nuclear bomb from a 
launch site in the Soviet Union all the way to a target deep inside North America.57 This 
was revolutionary, even though the reliability of the test rocket left something to be 
desired, missing its target by hundreds of miles.58 The Soviet Union carefully managed 
the release of this information to the world, creating the appearance that they were far 
ahead of the United States in the development of intercontinental-range missiles.59 The 
orbiting of Sputnik 1, the world's first artificial satellite, in fall of 1957 further reinforced 
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its appearance of superiority.60 While these actions would have the undesired outcome of 
provoking a dramatic increase in American spending on space exploration and long-range 
missiles, they bought the Soviet Union some much needed time to build up their actual 
nuclear strength while hiding behind imaginary rockets. 
Massive Retaliation was instantly obsolete. Washington and New York were too 
high a price to pay, even when America had enough firepower to kill a third of the Soviet 
population in a single day.61 The Soviet's frightening force of phantom missiles also 
"threatened" SAC's bomber bases, eroding the credibility of America's deterrent. 
Europeans began to question whether or not America had the stomach to still protect 
them when threatened with nuclear attack upon their own country. The American 
strategist Herman Kahn, working with the RAND Corporation, conducted a series of 
public opinion polls on this topic. He asked how many Americans could be justifiably 
sacrificed to defeat communism.62 Americans on average reported a willingness to 
sacrifice sixty million of their countrymen, fully a third of the country.63 When asked 
how many of his citizens the American President would sacrifice, Western Europeans 
gave answers ranging from two to twenty million, but trending towards the lower 
figure.64 The respondents felt the President would be unable to fight to a war that might 
see Boston sacrificed to save Bonn, permitting the Soviets to easily conquer Europe.65 
Faith in the alliance was dwindling. 
Seeking to restore Europe's faith in America's determination to contain the Soviet 
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Union, President Eisenhower traveled to Paris in late 1957 to meet with all the NATO 
heads of state.66 He brought along with him a bold proposal — the United States would 
provide to any interested NATO European ally intermediate range ballistic missiles, with 
ranges up to 1,500 km, capable of reaching deep into the Soviet Union.67 While the 
nuclear warheads themselves would remain in US custody until rising tensions made their 
arming necessary, the IRBM deal constituted a firm demonstration of America's support 
of their NATO allies.68 
The IRBMs, while politically useful, suffered from some very real technical 
limitations. The early models being offered to NATO were known as Jupiter and Thor. 
Both were powered by corrosive, dangerously unstable liquid fuel, meaning that they 
could only be fueled immediately prior to launch.69 They were also enormous machines, 
too heavy for easy fortification.70 This left them vulnerable, attractive targets for a sneak 
attack, and far inferior to the latest missiles just then starting to roll off American 
assembly lines.71 In a very real sense, America was offering these missiles to their allies 
not as a grand gesture, but simply to get rid of them. Caveat emptor, indeed. 
Because of these disadvantages, most of the NATO allies decided to pass. Italy 
and Turkey, however, accepted the offer. Thirty missiles were sent to Italy, becoming 
operational over the course of 1961.72 Fifteen missiles were sent to Turkey, but their 
activation was hampered by the language barrier between the American and Turkish 
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personnel, preventing the missiles from becoming operational before February of 1962. 
While these missiles did not add much to the nuclear strike capability the United States 
possessed, they were a potent demonstration of American commitment to the cause of 
European freedom.73 
Eisenhower, however, was left uneasy. With remarkable foresight, he commented 
to his cabinet even as the deal went ahead that if Mexico or Cuba fell to the communists 
and accepted Soviet missiles, "we would look on such developments with the gravest 
concern.. ."74 An aide present at the time of his comments remarked, "He wondered if we 
were not simply being provocative."75 
Senator John F. Kennedy made the Eisenhower Administration's national defence 
policies a centerpiece of his 1960 presidential run against Eisenhower's Vice President, 
Richard M. Nixon. Coming in for particular criticism was the policy of Massive 
Retaliation, which Kennedy attacked in a speech by saying, "Under every military budget 
submitted by [Eisenhower's] Administration, we have been preparing primarily to fight 
the one kind of war we least want to fight and are least likely to fight."76 
Kennedy then turned his political ire to the subject of the so-called "Missile Gap." 
Vanguard TV3, America's first artificial satellite, had failed to reach orbit, casting doubt 
on America's technical skill in the field of rocketry.77 The media soon picked up on the 
public's anxiety and began publishing numerous stories from anonymous sources in the 
US government and military, all warning that the Soviet Union had a massive lead over 
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the United States in intercontinental missiles.78 Public statements by the Eisenhower 
Administration boasting of America's bomber force did nothing to dampen public 
concerns.79 
Eisenhower was caught in an extremely frustrating position. By 1959, America's 
super-secret U-2 spy planes had proven that the Soviet Union did not possess a massive 
advantage in the number of missiles; indeed, no missiles at all were spotted.80 Even so, 
Eisenhower could not make a public statement explicitly denying that there was a gap 
without endangering the secrecy surrounding the U-2 missions. He therefore was forced 
to allow the American people to believe the Soviet charade that they were ahead in 
missiles, when in fact they had precisely zero operational ICBMS .81 
Senator Kennedy received classified briefings on this topic after securing the 
Democratic Party nomination for the Presidency. Kennedy either disbelieved the reports 
or cynically dismissed them and continued to campaign very effectively on the missile 
gap. Warning that the US deterrent, principally built around SAC's bomber aircraft, 
was vulnerable to a sneak attack by Soviet missiles, Kennedy called for an increase in 
Minuteman Missile development and more Polaris Missile-toting submarines.84 Both of 
these missile systems were easily hidden and had long range.85 Kennedy told the nation 
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that they could "not afford not to" deploy these expensive weapons.86 
After assuming office, Kennedy was angry that there was no missile gap, despite 
having been told so before the election.87 In his first meeting with reporters, Kennedy's 
new Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, confessed there was no gap, leading to a 
series of outraged reports by irate journalists.88 In the face of a sharp public backlash, 
McNamara backtracked, stated that there might be a missile gap, and ordered more 
Minuteman and Polaris missiles. This buildup continued even after a defector from the 
Soviet Chief Intelligence Directorate, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, confirmed that the 
United States was far, far ahead of the Soviet Union in all methods of warhead delivery.90 
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CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES - ALLIES OF NECESSITY 
The military relationship between Canada and the United States had evolved rapidly 
during the Second World War. In 1940, before his own country's entrance into the war, 
President Roosevelt announced to a graduating class at Queen's University that the 
United States would never permit a foreign power to invade Canada.91 A short time later, 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King made a reciprocal offer. The Permanent Joint Board on 
Defence, a working group of generals and admirals from both nations, was created that 
same year. Interestingly, while the Americans sought to quickly establish an overall 
unified command for North American defence, Canada refused to agree to such an 
arrangement except in the worst-case scenario. Until such a situation presented itself, 
however, Canada insisted on retaining a military autonomous from American control. 
After the war, Canada found that its moves towards closer integration with the 
United States could not easily be undone. Canada had participated in the creation of the 
atomic bomb and was thus inextricably intertwined with the bomb.95 Canadian military 
leaders were thrilled to enjoy such a close relationship with the undisputed master of 
modern military technology, which they hoped Canada might gain access to.96 
But such a relationship came with risks. Canada's position beneath the continental 
"air approaches" put it directly in the line of fire for any future world war.97 General 
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Foulkes, the Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, urged close cooperation with 
America since "there are no boundaries upstairs." 98 American war planners at the PJBD 
agreed that cooperation with the Canadians was paramount. A Military Co-Operation 
Committee (MCC), made up of the military representatives to the PJBD, was formed in 
1946, tasked with undertaking studies and issuing proposals on issues relating to 
continental defence.99A radar network was proposed. It would be assigned over a 
thousand jet fighters, the majority of them belonging to the RCAF.100 Enormously 
expensive and requiring years to be built, the plan was a fantasy. Little was done until the 
Soviets tested their first atomic bomb in 1949.101 There were no effective defences ready 
to stop Soviet bombers from reaching North American cities.102 Finally, the political will 
was found to take continental defence seriously. 
By the time incoming Soviet bombers could be detected and fighters scrambled, 
the USAF's leadership was worried that atomic bombs would already be raining down 
upon cities in the northern United States. The Americans therefore offered to construct 
a series of radar stations on Canadian soil, paid for and operated by the United States to 
permit early detection of Soviet bombers.104 Canada accepted the "Pinetree" proposal and 
offered to man half of the stations in late 1950. Canada also ordered nine squadrons of 
the Canadian-designed and built CF-100 Canuck fighter. The Americans suggested that 
fighter aircraft be assigned missions not based on nationality, but on proximity; the 
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Canadians agreed.105 
In 1952, another line was proposed two thousand miles north of the major North 
American cities.106 This would only be possible with the creation of a line of radar bases 
high in the Canadian arctic.107 Known as the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, it was a 
very expensive project, given that the total Canadian military presence in the Arctic 
Archipelago was 42 men. Desperate to establish the DEW Line, the United States 
agreed to an extremely generous arrangement, granting Canada excellent financial terms 
while respecting Canadian sovereignty.109 The Americans did not entirely live up to their 
obligations, but construction proceeded regardless.110 
In 1954, the US established the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), 
and pondered inviting Canada to join.111 There was significant support within CONAD 
for the creation of a unified command, a desire that was shared by the top ranks of the 
Canadian military. After some cajoling and salesmanship by General Foulkes, Prime 
Minister St. Laurent agreed to move forward with the proposal, but after the upcoming 
election, which they expected to win handily.113 
To the shock of everyone, the Liberals were not reelected, falling to the 
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Diefenbaker-led Progressive Conservatives.114 Foulkes directly lobbied the new Minister 
of National Defence, an old personal friend.115 Diefenbaker was convinced, and approved 
the plan without consulting cabinet.116 On August 1st 1957, the creation of the North 
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) was announced in both capitals.117 
NORAD was first governed by an ad hoc set of agreed principles decided upon by 
the military commands and known as the Terms of Reference. This was a major step 
forward in continental defence relations, but posed complex political problems. The 
conundrum for the ever-fretful sovereignty hawks in the Canadian government was aptly 
summarized in an internal memo, which warned that the arrangement would see, "the 
responsibility for the air defence of Canada, including the command of Canadian air 
defence forces, vested in a United States officer."118 The military commands in both 
capitals were eager to work together, but had grown wary of trying to reason with the 
sovereignty-obsessed Canadian officials, whom they viewed as short-sighted and 
meddling. Interestingly, this view of the Canadian government as an obstacle to taking 
necessary and desirable defensive measures was shared as strongly by the Canadian 
generals as by their impatient American counterparts.'19 
The NORAD Terms brought together disparate military assets on both sides of the 
border and put them under one officer, an American, with a Canadian as a deputy 
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commander. The assets available to NORAD were vast: thousands of jet fighters, dozens 
of anti-aircraft artillery batteries, and numerous radar stations scattered across the 
northern hemisphere, all reporting to a bi-national headquarters buried under a mountain 
near Colorado Springs, Colorado. The arrangement was bound to be at times awkward 
and almost always confusing. The Canadian units assigned to NORAD were kept under 
Canadian "control", but were under the "command" of an American. Should that 
American be incapacitated or simply absent from his underground headquarters, 
however, the entirety of the American air defence command apparatus would 
automatically be transferred to the command of a Canadian. While Canadian nationalists 
bemoaned a potential loss of Canadian sovereignty, many in the United States military 
arched a skeptical eyebrow at the idea that a surprise attack against the United States 
might see a Canadian, of all things, leading the American charge.121 
Even after Diefenbaker approved the Terms on his own authority^ there was still a 
need for a formal exchange of diplomatic texts to give a legal backing to what was at that 
time only a military agreement with the personal blessing of the necessary civilian 
leadership. This exchange of notes became problematic. Canadian officials at External 
Affairs immediately expressed concern that the Canadian air defence forces had been 
essentially handed over to the United States. George Pearkes, Diefenbaker's first Minister 
of National Defence, eloquently argued for the need for such a headquarters, saying that 
instead of giving up control of the RCAF to the United States, NORAD put the awesome 
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power of the USAF at the beck and call of Canada.122 
He also stressed, repeatedly and in clear language, that NORAD would not be 
able to undertake any action without the express approval of both governments, except in 
response to a direct attack.123 This was a critical issue, and was well received by the 
Canadian public, so much so that the language found its way directly into the final 
NORAD Agreement of May 1958. Despite putting the minds of the Canadian political 
establishment at ease, and pleasing Canadian popular opinion, the Agreement was 
essentially meaningless. NORAD was a defensive arrangement, and never would have 
undertaken offensive operations. If it was to be invoked at all, it would be to respond to a 
Soviet attack. Even if there was sufficient time to get both the President and the Prime 
Minister on the phone, they would have nothing further to say — NORAD had all 
necessary contingency orders signed and locked away, ready to be put into effect at a 
, - 1 2 4 
moment s notice. 
If North America were to be suddenly attacked, NORAD did not need to ask 
permission to defend the continent, it needed simply to invoke its standing orders. 
Consultation was thus guaranteed, indeed, it was pre-approved. In a world where both 
national capitals might be knocked out by nuclear missiles in a surprise attack, such was 
absolutely necessary. The Canadian Government knew this; Canadian generals and 
politicians received ultra-top-secret briefings on nuclear weapons protocols , and the 
Canadian Deputy Commander of NORAD was given authority by the President to use 
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nuclear weapons at his discretion.126 And yet Ottawa continued to expect a courtesy call 
before any action would be taken. This difference of opinion would have nearly 
disastrous consequences later. 
Now that it had agreed to an integrated continental defence command, the 
Canadian Air Force needed newer weapons, and in greater numbers, to be a credible 
partner. Diefenbaker was soon faced with a decision to make regarding the severely over-
budget Avro Arrow program, which was inconveniently being built in ridings that had 
helped to elect him. When the Americans announced that they were scaling back 
production of fighters in favour nuclear-tipped missiles, Diefenbaker announced that 
Canada would follow suit and would acquire nuclear warheads.128 With the BOMARC 
missiles ordered, Diefenbaker cancelled the Arrow program on February 20l , 1959.129 
The Air Force asked to purchase a smaller number of off-the-shelf American fighter jets, 
but Diefenbaker put off any decision. As will become clear later, such was his habit. 
Other parts of the Canadian military were faring better than the overburdened, 
beleaguered Air Force. Canada committed a full infantry division to NATO, kept mostly 
in Canada to be deployed when needed.130 The troops in Europe were armed with 
"Honest Johns", short-range cruise missiles.131 These ground troops were to be supported 
by an Air Division. This division, based in West Germany and France, totaled another six 
thousand men and almost 300 combat aircraft.132 
Maloney, 131. 
Van Dusen, 36. 
128
 Smith, 317. 
129
 Smith, 318. 
130Richter, 131. 
131 
Maloney, 60. 
1 3 2
 1U-A 
Ibid. 
42 
American troops assigned to the Canadian units retained physical possession of 
the atomic bombs they were to carry.133 This allowed Canada to claim it did not possess 
nuclear weapons.134 The sheer political cynicism of this move only became clear much 
later, after a wave of documents was declassified in the 1980s and 1990s, making plain 
that avoiding the appearance of being a nuclear power mattered more to External Affairs 
Minister Green than any other military or political arrangement. This is laid bare in the 
most recent scholarship, particularly that of Richter and Maloney. Much of the earlier 
scholarship focused more on determining what weapons Canada did possess, rather than 
examining the hows and whys behind the decisions to acquire certain weapons, such as 
the BOMARC missiles, while neglecting to acquire the warheads necessary for them to 
function properly. Minister Green's desperation to avoid being seen as being in favour of 
acquiring nuclear weapons, even while he helped develop protocols for their use by 
Canadian troops, was duly noted by increasingly bemused American leaders. 
While the far-flung radar lines were effective at detecting incoming bombers and 
missiles, a missile fired from a Soviet submarine might detonate faster than it could be 
detected and tracked.135 The Royal Canadian Navy, with a proven track record of sub-
hunting, was enlarged and modernized with more sailors, 18 new helicopter-carrying 
ships, and agreements with the RCAF for joint aerial patrols of coastal waters.136 By the 
time of the Crisis, the Fleet possessed 30 modern warships, backed up by 40 RCAF patrol 
planes.137 While the ships, planes, and helicopters would not normally carry nuclear 
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weapons, they were capable of firing them, if available.138 The American government 
quietly indicated that in the event of war, Canadian ships and planes would be welcome 
to arm themselves with American nuclear weapons, though Canada politely ignored an 
American offer to store such weapons on Canadian bases, for ease of deployment during 
139 
emergencies. 
After the 1960 American Presidential election, a brash young New England 
Catholic replaced President Eisenhower, with whom Diefenbaker had enjoyed a warm 
relationship. Kennedy and Diefenbaker were from far different political and personal 
backgrounds. Diefenbaker, the conservative, was shy and needy.140 Deeply insecure, he 
had a difficult time controlling his frequently turbulent emotions. The personal popularity 
of Lester Pearson, the leader of the Liberal opposition and recipient of the Nobel Peace 
Prize, immensely threatened him. Beset by his emotions and often paralyzed with self-
doubt, Diefenbaker would frequently freeze up in critical moments, refusing to make a 
decision unless he was certain it was the right one. 
Kennedy, in contrast, was of the younger generation, and indeed its very 
manifestation. The son of a wealthy Democratic Party supporter, Kennedy was driven by 
his father's ambition to the very heights of political power. Handsome, charming, and 
rich, Kennedy was known for his charisma and womanizing. Very real talent, however, 
matched his slick exterior. Kennedy was knowledgeable and brilliant, a graduate of 
Harvard, a combat veteran and winner of the Pulitzer Prize. After time in both the House 
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and Senate, representing Boston and Massachusetts as a whole, Kennedy became the first 
Catholic President in 1961, fulfilling the ambition his father had first entrusted to his 
eldest son, Joe Junior, who was killed in action during the Second World War. 
Indeed, bad luck and early death were a part of the chronically unhealthy 
Kennedy's life. He lost two siblings before taking office, and another was 
institutionalized due to mental disability. A football injury to his back during college, 
exacerbated by injuries sustained during the Second World War, left him in constant 
agony. He suffered from the painful and embarrassing digestive ailment of colitis, and 
Addison's Disease, an adrenal gland deficiency that left him dependent on steroids to 
live. Kennedy took numerous, conflicting medications daily. Friends of Kennedy recount 
that he was always obsessed with the notion of his own mortality, and that he pursued 
every desire with all his energy. His restless impulse to change the world was utterly at 
odds with Diefenbaker's hesitant conservatism. Diefenbaker would have much preferred 
a Nixon victory, as their meetings had been friendly and warm.141 Each man held the 
other in high esteem.142 
The two leaders got off to a rocky start. Diefenbaker telegrammed his best wishes 
upon Kennedy's electoral victory, and felt the younger man was tardy in responding. 
Jealous of his popularity, Diefenbaker privately remarked to colleagues that he 
considered the new President "courageously rash" and felt that he made a world war 
more likely.143 Kennedy, when announcing that he had invited the Prime Minister to 
Washington for a day of meetings a month after taking office, referred to the Prime 
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Minister as an "old friend", but mispronounced his name "Diefen-bawker."144 The Prime 
Minister publicly accepted the invitation and also referred to the President as a friend but, 
privately, was outraged. Indeed, Diefenbaker unsuccessfully pressured Cabinet to issue a 
formal protest to the United States in response to the slight.145 
Kennedy was well prepared for this initial face-to-face encounter. His Secretary 
of State, Dean Rusk, wrote a memo for the President covering some of the salient points 
ahead of their meeting: economic issues between the two countries, an upcoming NATO 
meeting, the state of continental defence readiness and in particular the continuing 
Canadian delay in accepting nuclear weapons.146 Rusk also took pains to stress the 
correct pronunciation of Diefenbaker's name and informed the President that the Prime 
Minister was hard of hearing, something that he was embarrassed about and preferred to 
hide.147 An attached biography of Diefenbaker refers to him as a shrewd politician, a 
vigorous, self-confident leader whose electoral victory in 1958 was a personal triumph as 
much as political.148 The biography states that while Diefenbaker criticizes the United 
States to win over nationalist votes, he is not considered inherently anti-American and 
indeed, values a close relationship between the two countries and is firmly committed to 
the Western Allies' anti-communist stance. 
Attached to the cover letter was a fascinating memo, seventeen pages long, 
summarizing for the President the state of US-Canadian relations. The memo is largely 
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positive, commenting that while emerging Canadian nationalism can prove "annoying", 
Canada could be expected to side with America on most vital issues.149 In the area of 
continental defence, Rusk summarizes the opposition — political and popular — 
Diefenbaker faced in forging closer links to the United States, but saves some of the 
blame for Diefenbaker's government, stating that since the politically damaging 
cancellation of the Arrow, it had been painfully introspective and indecisive as regards 
defence issues.150 This frustrated Rusk, for, "Loss [of] the contributions of the Canadian 
military.. .would be intolerable in time of crisis."151 Overall, Canada is felt a close ally in 
the Cold War, but the hesitancy to increase military strength, as well as "neutralist" 
sentiments among certain Canadians, is viewed with concern.152 The topic of Canadian 
nationalism was also addressed, with one American official commenting before the trip, 
"I never realized they resented us as much as they do. I didn't realize they felt we were a 
monstrous, mammoth obliteration of their own identity and of their own arts and 
culture."153 
Sadly, that quote would have done more to prepare the President for his meeting 
with Diefenbaker than any memo or chat with Dean Rusk. 
The meeting itself lasted three hours, and consisted of a discussion in the Oval 
Office followed by a working lunch and a photo opportunity in the White House gardens 
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as Diefenbaker was leaving.15 Smiles for the cameras notwithstanding, the two men were 
not pleased with each other. Diefenbaker, having viewed the Oval Office's oil paintings 
of American naval victories, asked why no British victories from the War of 1812 were 
displayed.155 The President politely said that if he had such a picture, he would display it; 
Diefenbaker promised to find one. They then discussed fishing, and the President 
playfully doubted Diefenbaker's claims to have reeled in a 140-lbs Marlin. While 
considered by many present to have been an attempt by Kennedy to charm with humour, 
Diefenbaker was hurt.156 
The meeting itself was productive, and a formal Presidential visit to Ottawa was 
agreed upon for the coming months. Regardless, Kennedy found Diefenbaker insincere 
and remarked to his aides afterwards that he did not find the Prime Minister to be 
1 C ' l 
trustworthy. He commented further to his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 
that he did not "want to see that boring son of a bitch again."158 Diefenbaker was struck 
by Kennedy's intellect and devotion to peace, but bitterly recalled the pro-Nazi leanings 
of the Kennedy's father directly to the President.159 The President was unamused. Upon 
returning to Ottawa, the Prime Minister complained that the Oval Office's selection of 
paintings suggested the "Americans had won every damn war."160 He ordered the 
national librarian to find a painting showing an American defeat, commenting to an aide 
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that, "...we must teach [Kennedy] some history."161 
When President Kennedy arrived via Air Force One in Ottawa on May 16th, 1961, 
he was a humbled man. The Bay of Pigs fiasco, where American-trained and armed 
Cuban exiles had failed to overthrow the Castro regime, had humiliated him and only 
increased Castro's prestige.162 Nonetheless, he was buoyed by his reception in Ottawa, 
where 50,000 people lined the streets in Ottawa to see the President and his beautiful 
First Lady, Jackie. His own government hobbled by a monetary crisis, upon seeing 
Kennedy's reception by his adoring Canadian fans, a jealous Diefenbaker joked to 
reporters that he was glad Kennedy had not come to run against him in an election.I64 
The relationship between the two men continued to sour as soon as the welcoming 
ceremony began. After Diefenbaker welcomed Kennedy to Canada in French, the 
President joked off-the-cuff that he was no longer embarrassed about his own poor 
French.165 Diefenbaker's humiliation was intensified when the crowd of Canadian 
dignitaries and VIPs present at Air Force One's arrival laughed loudly.166 Now in a poor 
mood, Diefenbaker escorted the President to the home of the Governor General, where 
the Kennedy's would be staying. It was there that the two men partook in a ceremonial 
tree planting to symbolize the friendship between the two countries.167 Kennedy, smiling 
for the cameras and eager to show his youthful vigour, enthusiastically took the proffered 
shovel, dug into the ground, and ripped a series of muscles in his back as he turned the 
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sod.168 
Though he continued to smile for the reporters and was able to summon up the 
willpower to get through the tree planting and that evening's state dinner, Kennedy's 
injury was actually quite serious. He had undone years of healing to his tormented back, 
and would henceforth require multiple injections of pain killers each day to function.169 
While able to summon enough charm to get through the evening, Kennedy commented to 
staff, "The bastard [Diefenbaker] insisted that I get a shovel and dig. It was one of the 
most painful episodes I've ever had."170 Given Kennedy's long history of ill health and 
brushes with death, that is a powerful statement. He later expressed his displeasure in 
crasser terms; when told that Diefenbaker had referred to the tree planting as having been 
"exhilarating" Kennedy commented, "If that was an exhilarating experience, I never want 
to get laid again."171 
For obvious reasons, the President's health was not a matter of public discussion, 
and Kennedy concealed his agony so well that almost no one on the trip knew that 
anything was amiss. It was not until long after his death that his medical records were 
released to the public, revealing for the first time that the President was, in the words of 
one television pundit, "a walking pharmacy." Perhaps if the Prime Minister had known 
that the President was in agony, the meeting of the next morning might have gone more 
smoothly. 
As it happened, the meeting was a mixed affair. Kennedy first irked Diefenbaker 
by flirting with the Prime Minister's secretaries. Diefenbaker's 140-lbs Marlin was 
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mounted upon the wall in time for the President's arrival along with a painting of a 
British victory, from the War of 1812; Kennedy granted the fish was quite large.172 As 
before, the President had come well prepared for the meeting, with numerous memos in 
hand. They succinctly summarized the current state of American and Canadian relations, 
and were generally positive. A briefing memo on continental defence, for example, called 
military cooperation between the two countries "excellent."173 While critical of the 
Canadian government's procrastination on nuclear weapon acquisition, the memo 
expressly endorsed deepening ties with the Canadians.174 
An area the Americans were eager to further develop their relationship with 
Canada was in the field of defence production sharing. Fearful of having Canada's 
advanced armaments industry collapse for want of orders after the cancellation of the 
Arrow, the United States amended its "Buy American" Act to permit Canadian 
companies to bid on American defence contracts.175 This permitted the Canadian 
armaments industry to survive, even though Canada was purchasing half again as much 
in the United States as the US was in Canada.176 This issue was one of the meeting's few 
successes; an agreement was reached where the United States would provide Canada with 
66 F-104B Starfighter jets in exchange for Canada assuming the financial cost of the 
Pinetree Line and providing NATO with additional F-104s to be built and partially 
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funded by Canada.177 "Certain weapons" were to be provided by the United States at a 
later date.178 
Diefenbaker expressed firm support for Kennedy's strong stance on Berlin.179 He 
also offered muted support for American policy in Indo-China.180 He had no particular 
comment on the Bay of Pigs invasion, except to comment that he hoped the Americans 
would consult more closely with Canada in the future; Kennedy assured Diefenbaker that 
that would be the case, as he had learned much from the debacle and would not make 
those mistakes again.181 The most controversial issue was whether or not Canada would 
finally accept nuclear weapons. Diefenbaker stated his own personal support for the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by Canada, but expressed concern that it would be 
politically damaging for him to do so at that time.182 He asked for time over the coming 
summer to travel the country, persuading Canadians of the necessity of acquiring nuclear 
weapons.183 Considering this a breakthrough at last on a contentious issue, Diefenbaker's 
pledge was dutifully recorded by the President's aides and filed away as an official State 
Department Memorandum of Conversation.184 This would come back to haunt 
Diefenbaker. 
After covering further issues, most significantly when Diefenbaker told Kennedy 
flatly that Canada had no interest in joining the Organization of American States (OAS), 
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the meeting adjourned. The exact details of what happened next remain unknowable, 
as Diefenbaker's recollection of the event shifted many times. In effect, however, 
Diefenbaker came to possess a briefing note written by presidential aide Walter W. 
Rostow, for the President himself, which outlined what the objectives of the trip were. In 
concise language, it stated that the United States "should push" Canada to take a greater 
role in Latin American affairs, join the Organization of American States, and increase 
their foreign aid spending.186 At various points, Diefenbaker would claim that he found 
the document himself, that it was left in the trash and recovered by a janitor, or that an 
aide found it buried amidst couch cushions. Almost two years after this, the Prime 
Minister's personal assistant at the time, Basil Robinson, would quietly inform US 
officials that it was indeed found by a janitor, but Diefenbaker, in a foul mood, rebuffed 
Robinson's urging to return the document forthwith and filed it away for future use.187 
Diefenbaker's refusal to return the document was a major diplomatic breach of 
etiquette. While the document was innocuous, using the word "push" in a way 
synonymous with "urge", Diefenbaker felt it perfectly encapsulated Kennedy's 
arrogance. 
As with the President's back injury, the details of Diefenbaker's acquisition of the 
Rostow Memorandum were unknown at the time, and are virtually impossible to 
determine today. Almost every source conveys a different story. Diefenbaker himself 
claimed, both in person and in his memoirs, that the Memorandum was given to him 
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directly by an American, suggesting that some sympathetic figure in Kennedy's inner 
circle was perhaps embarrassed by his President's pushy behaviour. Both Robinson and 
Van Dusen refute this, offering similar versions of the event, wherein the document was 
simply forgotten in Diefenbaker's office after the meeting. While the details vary — was 
it found by Diefenbaker himself, or pulled from between couch cushions by a sharp-eyed 
janitor? — both men are in full agreement that the Prime Minister made a calculated 
choice to hold onto the document, and hid this from practically everyone. 
Knowlton Nash explores this issue at length in Kennedy and Diefenbaker, and 
largely corroborates this version of the event, but includes far more details and contrasts 
the differing versions. The underlying conclusion, however, remains the same: when 
Diefenbaker elected not to return the document immediately, he trapped himself, as he 
could never again offer it up to the Americans without being asked why he had not done 
so immediately. Nash points out that Diefenbaker could have simply destroyed the 
document, or taken the secret with him to his grave, and is clear that he feels that such 
would have been the wiser, more honourable thing to do. Such sentiments were shared by 
the contemporary American diplomatic staff in Ottawa and senior administration officials 
in Washington, as will be discussed at length below. 
Diefenbaker's dislike of Kennedy was reinforced that evening when President 
Kennedy addressed Parliament and publicly repeated his call for Canada to join the OAS, 
which Diefenbaker took as a personal insult, given that he had already told the President 
no.188 After the address, which was received extremely well by Parliament, as well as the 
Canadian public and press, Kennedy and Diefenbaker dined together at the home of 
Nash, 125. 
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American Ambassador Livingston Merchant. Kennedy, despite being seated next to 
Diefenbaker, spent most of the evening talking with Mike Pearson, a snub so obvious that 
Merchant recalled exchanging awkward glances with other attendees while Kennedy and 
Pearson chatted.189 Diefenbaker left in a huff.190 Members of Kennedy's inner circle, 
including National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, would comment that Kennedy's 
personal dislike of Diefenbaker led him to act in an intentionally discourteous, insensitive 
manner towards his host.191 Such treatment was tailor-made to wound the deeply insecure 
Diefenbaker. 
After the Ottawa trip, Kennedy and Diefenbaker were able to conduct their 
personal business almost entirely by telegram and letter. Several months after the trip, 
Secretary of State Rusk urged the President to send a letter to Diefenbaker reminding him 
of his promise to persuade the Canadian people to a more pro-nuclear position.192 The 
letter, signed and sent by Kennedy on August 3rd of 1961, also stresses that a strong 
North American air defence is necessary to safeguard America's bomber fleet, the 
backbone of NATO's strength. Diefenbaker received the letter while vacationing in 
Saskatoon and responded a week later, telling the President that he shared his concern 
over Berlin, and that, mindful of his earlier promise, he would move forward immediately 
and had arranged a meeting with his Minister of National Defence, Douglas Harkness, 
and his Minister of External Affairs, Howard Green.194 
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A month later the Embassy in Ottawa reported to the State Department that the 
Prime Minister and Minister Harkness were "obviously engaged in a well-organized and 
Cabinet-approved public campaign" to sway public opinion, despite Diefenbaker being ill 
with a rotten tooth.195 Liberals and New Democrats were reportedly assailing the 
government for refusing to announce their decision.196 
This progress was derailed by a careless leak in late September to Canadian 
reporters in Washington that Canada had agreed to accept nuclear warheads but had not 
yet publicly announced it. The Embassy worried — correctly, ultimately — that 
Diefenbaker would be forced to delay announcing his decision to avoid looking like an 
American puppet. While the Embassy tersely reported that "determination [to] take right 
decision not fundamentally shaken," the timing of the announcement is now "difficult to 
predict."197 A follow-up report from the Embassy in early October glumly reports that the 
Prime Minister had suspended any consideration of accepting nuclear weapons for the 
Canadian military until "the dust has settled."198 Days later, the Embassy cabled another 
report, saying that Harkness, America's "best friend" in Ottawa, was so frustrated that he 
was considering resigning, a prospect the Americans viewed with alarm.199 For Harkness, 
this was not the first time a leak from Washington had hurt him politically; nine months 
earlier, he had unofficially complained that such leaks were making it hard for him to 
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push forward Canada's adoption of nuclear weapons. These impressions were 
confirmed by the works of Van Dusen and Robinson, who both suggest that while 
Diefenbaker was inclined to accept nuclear weapons, he was loathe to do so under even 
the slightest appearance of American pressure. This purely personal reluctance answers 
the question of what took Canada so long, something that left McLin and Lyon confused. 
Regardless of his motivations, Diefenbaker's constant hesitancy to move forward 
with the decision to adopt nuclear weapons, without which the F-104 fighters and 
BOMARC missiles that Canada had deployed were nearly useless, confirmed for 
Kennedy his initial impression of Diefenbaker as being an insincere, untrustworthy man. 
As Canada became increasingly viewed as unreliable, its ability to influence decisions in 
Washington plummeted.201 
On December 30th, 1961, Ambassador Merchant cabled the State Department 
with a four-page letter giving his assessment of the current political landscape and its 
likely ramifications for the United States. Describing the Progressive Conservatives as 
weak, he foresaw that the ongoing procrastination by the Canadian government to accept 
nuclear weapons would likely continue until the next election, which he felt would come 
soon.202 The Pearson Liberals were deemed friendly to the US except in vital military 
areas, and the NDP was considered almost inherently anti-American.203 He followed up 
two months later with a bleak report criticizing Canada's "failure to own up" to the issue 
of nuclear weapons, despite the fact that the Canadian military had already deployed 
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numerous weapons that were "next to useless" without them.204 Merchant urged the 
President to write the Prime Minister again, but this step was not taken. 
Kennedy did write to Diefenbaker six weeks later, on April 13 th, 1962. Kennedy 
opened by saying, "For some time I have had the uneasy feeling that perhaps the 
positions of our two countries were becoming increasingly disparate." 205 The President 
asked for Canada's support against calls for a nuclear test ban treaty.206 Perhaps 
surprising given the extent of the personal antipathy between them, Diefenbaker made a 
strong statement to the press the very next day, which was duly noted in Washington.207 
President Kennedy cabled the Prime Minister immediately with a message of personal 
thanks for the "authoritative and timely recording of the Voice of Canada."208 
This brief blip of harmony was soon destroyed by the event that would come to 
define relations between the two men. Diefenbaker, exhausted by a flagging election 
campaign against Pearson, was mortified to learn that while attending a White House 
reception hosted by the President and First Lady for Nobel Prize winners, Pearson had 
enjoyed a private, 45-minute long meeting with the President.209 Diefenbaker went into a 
rage when informed of the April 29th chat, hotly telling his staff that it was clear that the 
7 1 0 
President was conspiring with Pearson to defeat him. To be fair, as Pearson's memoirs 
make clear, Kennedy was quite open in private about his desire to see Pearson replace 
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Diefenbaker, despite frequent public statements to the contrary by American officials to 
Canadian press. The Liberals themselves did indeed seize upon the incident as an 
example of Pearson's statesmanship: even the President of the United States sought his 
counsel.211 Already spiteful of Kennedy and constantly jealous of Pearson, this 
confluence of events would provoke Diefenbaker into a rash act. 
When Ambassador Merchant, on the verge of retirement after a long career, called 
upon Diefenbaker on May 5l to bid him farewell, he was floored by Diefenbaker's state. 
Having been forewarned by Basil Robinson that the Prime Minister was "extremely 
agitated"212 by Pearson's chat with Kennedy, Merchant was still alarmed by the extent of 
his distemper, considering him "excited to a degree disturbing in a leader of an important 
country."213 Indeed, the Ambassador described the Prime Minister as ".. .closer to 
hysteria than I have ever seen him, except on one other possible occasion."214 
Having accused the President of meddling in Canadian affairs, Diefenbaker 
revealed to Merchant his possession of the Rostow Memorandum, claiming it was given 
to "someone" in External Affairs shortly after the President's visit to Ottawa, insinuating 
that there was a mole inside Kennedy's inner circle.215 Diefenbaker angrily claimed he 
had every intention of using it in the election to show the Canadian electorate that John 
Diefenbaker was standing up for Canada.216 
Aghast, Merchant urged the Prime Minister to reconsider, insisting "in the 
strongest terms" that any document, prepared by a member of the President's staff and 
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explicitly addressed to the President himself, was property of the United States.217 He 
warned there would be "serious backlash" in Washington, throwing US-Canadian 
relations into chaos.218 Merchant continued to say that if Diefenbaker publicly revealed 
his possession of a privileged document belonging to the United States, whatever effect it 
might have on the campaign, the American government would demand to know why it 
had not been immediately returned in accordance with both protocol and the traditions of 
allied, friendly governments.219 Merchant also reminded Diefenbaker that he was an ally 
of the United States, and urged him not to allow a domestic campaign to divide the 
Western bloc.220 
Merchant left that night, feeling as though he had helped calm Diefenbaker, but 
having "no sense of assurance" that the document would remain private.221 This 
apprehension was in part based on Diefenbaker's comment that if he chose to release the 
document, he would wait until Merchant had returned to America, so as to "not spoil 
[his] last few days in Ottawa." Merchant immediately cabled Washington, writing, "As 
is apparent, we have a problem."223 Seeking to smooth over Diefenbaker's ruffled 
feathers, particularly as regarded his worry that Kennedy favoured Pearson, Merchant 
urgently requested that an informal working meeting between the President and Prime 
Minister be arranged.224 
Assistant Secretary of State George Ball responded three days letter with a letter 
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laying out a hard line for Ambassador Merchant to take. While urging Merchant to assure 
the Prime Minister that he understood how stressful electoral campaigns could be, he also 
stressed that Merchant must make clear that the United States would respond badly to any 
leak of a private document addressed to the President.225 Ball also stated bluntly that the 
President has "no intention or desire" to meet with the Prime Minister.226 Merchant 
delivered the message four days later on May 12th, saying that he had not reported the 
threat to reveal the document to Washington out of concern for the "catastrophic" impact 
977 
it would have on relations. Diefenbaker declared that he had no intention of using the 
Memo, but promised to inform Merchant should he change his mind. Merchant himself 
cabled Rusk that he felt the "storm had passed" and reported that Diefenbaker seemed to 
him to be on the verge of exhaustion. 
The damage to US-Canadian relations was indeed potentially catastrophic. When 
told of Diefenbaker's threat, Kennedy went into a rage, decrying it as blackmail.229 He 
continued on at some length, at one point declaring the he would have liked to cut 
"[Diefenbaker'] balls off." Ted Sorensen, Kennedy's top speech writer and close 
personal confidant, was present, and knew full well that Kennedy always responded 
extremely badly to being threatened.231 While urging the President to be calm, even Rusk 
considered Diefenbaker's actions "unforgivable."232 While his carefully considered 
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instructions to Merchant helped stabilize the situation, Kennedy swore that he would 
never again meet with Diefenbaker.233 The President's intense dislike filtered down 
throughout the bureaucracy; Canadian diplomats and journalists found themselves cut out 
of the loop on issues to which they would previously have had access.234 The entire bi-
lateral relationship between the two governments was noticeably chilled, even while the 
diplomats and military officials in both capitals did their very best to leverage their 
personal relationships and outright friendships to minimize the disruption. 
The election on June 18th did little to rectify the situation. Diefenbaker had run a 
disorganized, scattered campaign, one that was populist, anti-American, and saw 
increasingly heated attacks upon Pearson.235 Despite the intensity of the campaign, 
however, Diefenbaker refrained from revealing the existence of the Rostow 
Memorandum, though the Embassy in Ottawa reported having received unofficial reports 
that the Conservative leadership was incensed at what it considered pro-Liberal 
interference by America.236 The Conservatives lost 92 seats, resulting in a very slim Tory 
minority in the face of strong gains by the Liberals and the NDP.237 Diefenbaker's 
political future now hinged upon being able to get along with his archrival, the friend of 
Kennedy.238 Personal blows soon compounded the bitter political defeat. Diefenbaker 
badly broke his ankle while taking a walk in his garden; already depressed by his 
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electoral defeat and in mourning for a dear friend lost to a car crash, he took to bed.239 
The new Canadian minority government was now at a dead stop. 
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CASTRO'S CUBA 
Even while governance in Canada was grinding to a halt, in Cuba, the revolutionary 
government led by Fidel Castro was as abuzz with activity as it had been in years. Castro 
had been swept to power in 1959 after three years of guerilla warfare waged against 
unpopular dictator Fulgencio Batista,240 having leveraged the civilian casualties caused 
by Batista's crackdowns to gather around him an army.241 Even after his brother Raul 
took US military personnel in Cuba hostage, the Eisenhower Administration recognized 
that Batista was corrupt and unpopular, and had no particular desire to support him. They 
pressured him to step down to avoid needless bloodshed.242 
Castro seized the capital of Havana in 1959, and was recognized as Prime 
Minister by the United States.243 Eisenhower even approved an aid package of eight 
hundred million dollars.244 The United States was willing to stay friendly so long as 
Castro did not rule as a communist.245 Castro wisely refrained from doing so, despite the 
urgings of Raul and their comrade Che Guevara, both avowed communists.246 
Early American hopes for a peaceable relationship quickly evaporated, however. 
Castro, having taken power, began to purge the island. Former members of the Batista 
regime and members of the military were tried for vague crimes against the people, with 
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Castro personally involving himself in the process to ensure guilty verdicts.247 Other 
possible threats to the revolution were quietly rounded up and "disappeared," though 
sources in Cuba close to the US confirmed at least three hundred executions.248 
More worrisome to Eisenhower than these post-revolutionary excesses, however, 
was Castro's increasingly obvious anti-Americanism. Though careful to avoid overtly 
provoking the Americans, Castro frequently stated in speeches that they wished to see 
him removed from power. He also called attention to the extent of America's economic 
control over Cuba; ironically, then-senator Kennedy was sympathetic to this, having 
given a speech on the Senate floor pointing out that any country that had so much foreign 
investment could hardly be considered sovereign.249 Castro's repeated statements that the 
United States was staunchly opposed to him ultimately became a self-fulfilling prophecy 
— his anti-American political rhetoric began to annoy Washington, which soured on the 
new Cuban leader.250 
Castro did himself no favours when, in announcing Stalinist agricultural reforms, 
9S 1 
he expropriated enormous tracts of land owned by American companies in June 1959. 
Even worse was his decision to accept Soviet military officers as trainers for his new 
Revolutionary Army, which was to be armed with Soviet-built weapons. Having 
decided that Castro would never be a stable neighbour, Eisenhower authorized his 
various intelligence agencies to consider how best to "check" the rise of Castro's power 
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in November that same year.253 In March of 1960, Castro seized upon the explosion of a 
freighter carrying munitions in Havana's harbour as sign of an American-sponsored 
counter-revolutionary plot.254 Castro placed even more orders for Soviet weapons.255 
When President Kennedy came to office in 1961, the CIA presented him a plan 
that called for an invasion of Cuba and the removal of Castro. By the time it was 
presented to the inexperienced President, the plan was fully developed and in a high state 
of readiness, and had been approved by President Eisenhower.256 It called for a brigade of 
pro-American Cuban refugees to invade Cuba, establish a beachhead, and then raise an 
anti-Castro army. Kennedy refused to go along with the plan as written, insisting that US 
forces would not come to the aid of the exiles once they were ashore. The CIA continued 
to support the invasion even though it was becoming increasingly clear that the lack of 
US support, Castro's tremendous popularity, and the growing strength of the Cuban 
Revolutionary Army made it a doomed exercise.257 
The invasion, launched on April 17th 1961, was a debacle. Half the troops were 
captured when their ship ran aground on a reef, while the half that did land faced a pro-
Castro unit twenty times their size.258 The Cuban Air Force sank the invasion's supply 
ships while still laden with food and ammunition, and no further ships were willing to 
•JCQ "} f.f\ 
proceed without an American escort. Despite being fearful of looking like "a bum" , 
Kennedy, worried about a Soviet retaliation against Berlin, stood firm and refused to 
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order direct US action.261 Though he resisted pressure from his generals and the CIA, the 
President was deeply upset, and spent a sleepless night weeping while the exiles 
fought.262 
Alarmed by the invasion, and numerous subsequent attempts by the CIA to 
assassinate him263, Castro rushed into the waiting arms of the Soviet Union.264 The US 
responded with a trade embargo and low-level guerilla activity that only pushed Castro 
deeper into the Soviet camp, which readily supplied Cuba with military hardware and 
advisors.265 After narrowly surviving an attack by US-supported guerillas, Castro began 
to give speeches warning his people of an invasion he deemed imminent. Ironically 
given what was to come, that particular attack killed many Soviet military advisors sent 
to Cuba secretly.267 
The exact steps that led to Soviet nuclear missiles being introduced to Cuba are 
unclear, as both Khrushchev and Castro gave many conflicting statements. Certainly, it 
provided advantages to both. While the Soviet Union's efforts to develop a reliable 
ICBM continued to flounder, they did possess many medium and intermediate range 
ballistic missiles capable of hitting America from Cuba.268 These missiles dramatically 
increased the capability of the Soviets to strike America. For the Soviets, they were a 
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stopgap measure to give them time to develop true ICBMs.270 For Castro, they provided a 
deterrent from invasion, and represented a demonstration of Soviet commitment to Cuban 
security. 
The United States noted a sudden increase in Soviet naval activity in August of 
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1962. The same report that tabulated a greater number of Soviet ships than normal 
arriving in Havana also reported that the cargoes being offloaded were being protected 
from scrutiny, while also reporting that several large-scale military construction projects 
979 
had begun. Interestingly, however, as late as the middle of September, the United 
States intelligence community did not believe that these sites were likely to be for nuclear 
missiles; they considered that too provocative, and felt that airfields or possibly even a 
submarine base were more likely.273 Given that the Soviet's client state, East Germany, 
had just begun construction on the Berlin Wall, the intelligence analysts thought that 
Khrushchev would likely try to reduce tensions in the short-term.274 
Khrushchev himself had sought to allay American fears, having his Ambassador 
to the United Nations assure his American counterpart, Adlai Stevenson, that the Soviet 
military shipments to Cuba were of a "purely defensive nature" on September 4th.275 The 
Soviet state news agency, TASS, reiterated this claim one week later.276 President 
Kennedy, looking to bolster his party's chances in the upcoming Congressional elections, 
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made a strong statement two days later, declaring that if the Soviet Union turned Cuba 
into "an offensive military base.. .then [America] would do whatever must be done to 
protect its own security, and that of its allies."277 
The first Soviet nuclear missile arrived two days later.278 
Ibid, 27-28. 
Ibid, 28. 
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 
In late August, before the flurry of diplomacy had led the Soviets to deny their intention 
to put in the missiles, a stroke of bad luck began undoing their secrecy. An American U-2 
plane on a routine reconnaissance mission near one of the construction sites 
photographed a missile battery that had been so recently deployed it had not been 
camouflaged. When the pictures were scrutinized, it was revealed to be a SA-2 missile 
launcher, the most advanced anti-aircraft weapon in the Soviet inventory, only available 
in limited numbers. The fact that the Soviets were deploying their best anti-aircraft 
missiles amidst an isolated jungle created a ripple of interest at the CIA. What were they 
protecting? John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, believed nuclear missiles 
were the likely candidate, but could not prove it. 
Spies began to report missile-like objects being trucked around the island.280 
Despite earlier doubts and Soviet denials, the increased naval activity, spotting of the SA-
2 missiles, and now reports of missile-like objects raised the speculation in Washington 
to a fevered pitch. On October 9th, U-2 planes began intensive overflights of Cuba. A 
flight on October 14th passed over one of the construction sites, confirming the presence 
of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba.281 
When informed first thing the following morning, Kennedy was personally 
insulted. "They can't do that to me!" he shouted in anger, while his brother is reported to 
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have responded more succinctly: "Shit. Shit. Oh....shit!"282 Kennedy felt that 
Khrushchev had stepped over a personal line by doing this just before the Congressional 
elections. 83 Seeking perhaps to avoid any political complications, Kennedy included two 
Republicans in his first meeting on the Crisis, proving that he considered it as much a 
threat to his Administration as he did America's national security.284 At that meeting, 
Kennedy and his hand-picked group advisors — "ExComm" — were sobered to learn 
that the missiles could be ready for launch in as little as one week.285 One of his first 
orders was to increase still further the number of U-2 flights over Cuba to ascertain if 
there were other missile launch sites.286 
The news received back from the flights was grim. The presence of SS-4 missiles, 
capable of hitting Washington, DC and many of SAC s bomber bases, was again 
confirmed. It became clear, however, that some of the sites under construction were for 
the larger SS-5 IRBM; this missile had twice the range and explosive power of its 
shorter-range counterpart and was capable of striking nearly every major American city 
and many in Canada and Central America.287 The sites, not all of which yet had missiles 
emplaced, were heavily defended by SA-2 missiles and were crawling with ground troops 
and equipment, believed (correctly) to be Soviet personnel. Alarmingly, however, the 
U-2 flights revealed only the locations for 30 missiles, while the number of ships recently 
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980 
sent to Cuba was sufficient to have transported 48 missiles. The Air Force said it was 
capable of destroying 90% of the known missiles in a sneak attack, but that meant that 
between surviving missiles and those yet to be found, in the aftermath of a US attack on 
Cuba, as many 21 nuclear missiles might remain.290 
Some members of ExComm, including Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, 
were initially dismissive of the missiles, viewing it as a Soviet propaganda stunt.291 
Kennedy himself rejected this option, saying that the missiles might not impact the 
strategic situation, but because they had been slipped in right under the nose of America, 
they certainly hurt its prestige.292 Ambassador Stevenson, considered by many in the 
Administration to be alarmingly dovish, suggested a diplomatic deal with the Soviets 
whereby the Cuban missiles would be removed in exchange for a similar removal of the 
American Jupiter missiles in Turkey; this was rejected as being not only damaging to 
America's prestige but her credibility with her allies. Other options, such as using 
airdropped shotgun pellets to damage the missiles or sending in commandos to blow 
them up directly were studied and rejected.294 
ExComm quickly distilled the remaining options into two: the "fast track" option 
of air strikes to destroy the missiles or the "slow track" of imposing a blockade upon 
Cuba until the Soviets removed the missiles. ExComm was split on the issue, with most 
favouring a sudden air strike to destroy the missiles. There were serious disadvantages to 
an air strike, however. It ran the risk of provoking a violent response by the Soviet 
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Union.295 The members of ExComm, even those in favour of an air attack, agreed that the 
probable Soviet response would have been to attack West Berlin.296 The President 
agreed.297 Any air strike would not simply have been targeting the missiles themselves, 
but would have killed the Soviet ground personnel who were constructing and guarding 
the missiles.298 McNamara asked if it would be possible to attack the missile sites while 
only wounding them. General LeMay of the Strategic Air Command replied simply, 
"You must have lost your mind."299 
Robert Kennedy was vehemently opposed to an air strike. He retold in later years 
how his first thought upon hearing it discussed was, "Now I know how Tojo must have 
felt," referring to Japan's sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.300 Robert Kennedy argued that 
any such sneak attack would be contrary to American tradition and would alienate the 
entire world. McNamara supported him.301 US warplanes would first have to destroy 
Cuba's radar network, then its air force, and finally the SA-2 batteries, before being able 
to safely bomb the missile sites. 
Their favoured alternative — a blockade of all weapons being sent to Cuba — had 
the disadvantages of giving away the element of surprise for no immediate gain. At its 
core, the blockade option would put pressure upon the Soviet Union to remove the 
missiles without violence, and would avoid backing Khrushchev into a corner where he 
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felt compelled to react against Berlin. Sorensen, also in favour of a blockade, wrote a 
memo to the President stating that a blockade was, "a more prudent and flexible step 
which enables us to move to an air strike, invasion, or any other step at any 
time.. .without the 'Pearl Harbor' posture."304 Swayed by the memo and the support of 
the blockade option expressed by Robert Kennedy and McNamara, Kennedy settled upon 
that option on October 20 , six days after the missiles had first been photographed. 
The Administration also began to consider the need to consult with their allies. In 
the case of Canada, this issue of consultation was particularly complex due to the 
"consultation" promise within the NORAD Agreement. This insistence on close 
consultation was unsurprisingly a Canadian initiative, since as the smaller power, the 
Canadian military was more likely to be swept up in an American alert than vice versa. 
The Americans had accommodated this fully; not only did the NORAD Agreement itself 
specify the requirement of consultation, but Canada and the United States had 
subsequently signed two specific, secret protocols reiterating this.305 
The Cuban Missile Crisis, however, was a kind of crisis that NORAD proved 
unable to easily face. NORAD's bi-national design conferred many tactical 
advantages, but was operationally cumbersome. Both countries appreciated that rapid 
orders would be necessary in the event of a sneak attack. As written in the Agreement, 
and confirmed by the subsequent secret ones, the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD could 
issue orders to his squadrons in the event of an imminent or actual attack upon North 
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America, with all necessary paperwork already in place to permit that action.307 The 
framework of the various agreements also provided an understanding that in the midst of 
a major international crisis, the two countries would have sufficient time to consult and if 
warranted, agree to an increased alert by NORAD as a precautionary measure or as a 
show of resolve. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis, however, was an unforeseen type of crisis. The 
Americans were able to keep it secret from the time that the U-2 photographs were 
processed on October 15th until the President's famous televised speech on October 22nd, 
a full week.309 A NORAD alert, which would have been detected by the Soviets, would 
have thrown away America's ability to launch a surprise attack.310 There is also the issue 
of how much the Canadians could have hoped to contribute to a NORAD alert. In a 
military sense, the facts are clear: the participation of Canada would have been helpful, 
but not significant. 
Canada's lack of nuclear weapons had left it largely toothless.3" The Royal 
Canadian Air Force's nine squadrons of the subsonic CF-100 Canuck fighters had been 
withdrawn from NORAD service several months earlier.312 These had been replaced by 
supersonic CF-101B Voodoos.313 Four squadrons were already operational.314 While 
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these 48 aircraft represented a significant technological improvement over the Canucks, 
they carried non-nuclear guided missiles.315 Each missile would only have been capable 
of damaging a single bomber. The Americans had designed these planes under the 
specific assumption that they would be firing nuclear missiles, and when Canada had 
accepted them, they agreed the planes would be delivered as built, without modifications 
to make them more effective if armed with only conventional weapons.316 
The BOMARC missiles that Diefenbaker had announced after canceling the CF-
105 Arrow were even worse; without nuclear weapons, they were quite literally 
useless. The missiles were not capable of self-correcting their course. They could be 
aimed at the approaching enemy bombers and told at what altitude to explode, but after 
launch, were basically time bombs flying in a straight line. It was only by being armed 
with nuclear warheads that they could have any hope at all of destroying enemy aircraft. 
Since Canada lacked nuclear weapons and they were not designed to carry high-explosive 
warheads, Canada's BOMARCs were loaded with payloads of sandbags, for weight.318 
The Royal Canadian Navy, however, was better equipped to assist in the Crisis. 
The Atlantic Fleet, based in Halifax, was a sizable force. It possessed an aircraft carrier, 
eighteen destroyers and eleven frigates.319 These latter 29 warships were ideal for hunting 
down Soviet submarines. The RCAF's naval squadrons were also better prepared to make 
direct contributions to the Crisis, as their 40 long-range surveillance planes were capable 
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of feeding valuable intelligence back to Halifax. While there was no maritime 
equivalent of NORAD insofar as a single overarching agreement, there were pre-existing 
arrangements between the Canadian and American fleets that permitted close cooperation 
without having the necessity of securing specific government orders.321 Even though they 
lacked a centralized command, the Royal Canadian and the United States Navies were 
ready and able to function as a combined unit. This was further reinforced by the close 
personal and professional relationship between the respective national Atlantic Fleet 
Commanders. The RCN, however, had not been able to acquire the nuclear torpedoes 
and depth-charges they had requested. 
President Kennedy, having settled upon a blockade, dispatched personal 
emissaries to certain key US allies whose support his Administration considered vital, 
including Canada. The President called upon Livingston Merchant, the retired 
Ambassador that Diefenbaker had harangued over the Rostow Memorandum, to be his 
representative. The President made personal phone calls to External Affairs to make sure 
that the meeting would be expedited and that Prime Minister appreciated the dire urgency 
of the situation. 
Diefenbaker already knew of the Crisis. In Washington, two Canadian 
intelligence officials had been informally invited to sit in on a meeting of their American 
colleagues.324 These agents of course reported to Ottawa immediately that the missiles 
existed, but they did not have any information on what the President intended to do about 
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them. Likewise, American military officers at NORAD had quietly revealed the existence 
of the missiles to their Canadian brothers-in-arms.325 This was extremely classified. 
Diefenbaker's knowledge of the Crisis came only via personal friendships in Washington, 
and from American officers willing to break the law to keep their Canadian colleagues at 
NORAD up to date. Diefenbaker feigned shock at the revelations so well that many 
media pundits, and even his closest associates, believed that he had been caught virtually 
unawares by Merchant's presentation in Ottawa. It was not until Knowlton Nash 
personally interviewed some of the Canadians who were "in the know" that the extent of 
Diefenbaker's knowledge became clear. This serves to strip away one of the main 
defences offered up by Diefenbaker supporters: that anyone would have been taken aback 
by such frightening news. Diefenbaker, as Nash made clear, had had time for the reality 
of the Crisis to sink in, and was still determined to view it more as a personal insult than 
an international emergency. This was not a result of shock, where an overburdened mind 
turned to the comfort of anger to avoid thinking about the unthinkable. It is, simply put, a 
sign of Diefenbaker's character. 
Thus when Diefenbaker received Merchant, he was somewhat prepared for what 
was to come. With him in his office when he received the Ambassador was Howard 
Green, his Minister of External Affairs, and Harkness of National Defence. Merchant 
told the Prime Minister that the nature of the crisis at hand was such that normal means of 
communication had not been possible, hence the sending of a personal emissary and the 
relative lateness of the Prime Minister's notification. He did this in part because upon 
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arrival he found the Prime Minister in a foul mood and sought to placate him from the 
outset. He then presented to the Prime Minister President Kennedy's personal letter. In 
it, the President summarized in a few sentences the discovery of the missiles in Cuba, 
informed the Prime Minister that he had sent a letter to Khrushchev demanding their 
removal, and that he intended to immediately call for an emergency meeting of the 
United Nations Security Council.328 He concluded by stating, "It is most important that 
we should all keep in close touch with each other, and I will do all I can to keep you 
informed of developments as I get them."329 
The vagueness of NORAD's consultation clause proved problematic. Diefenbaker 
was being "consulted," but only upon decisions that the Americans had already reached. 
The hypersensitive Diefenbaker, already embittered towards Kennedy, was not being 
asked for advice, but for approval. As later written by close Diefenbaker aide H. Basil 
Robinson, Diefenbaker could do no more than "acknowledge [the letter's] receipt."330 
Diefenbaker's infamous pride was hurt. 
He asked for a summary of the speech's main points, which Merchant did before 
reading the text of it aloud to the Canadians. The men frequently interrupted to ask for 
clarification of various points. Diefenbaker asked if the blockade was to apply to aircraft 
bound for Cuba from the Eastern bloc or just vessels at sea, Merchant told him that as of 
that time, aircraft were not to be included in the blockade.331 They questioned the 
President's haste in moving so quickly to impose a blockade — technically an act of war 
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— without the prior approval of the United Nations. Merchant responded that the 
President felt the issue too urgent to defer action any longer. Diefenbaker asked how 
the British would respond to a blockade, an act they held in particular revulsion; 
Merchant agreed that they would likely object, but would agree with the Blockade once 
fully briefed. 
Diefenbaker also had strong objections to one particular part of the speech, 
wherein the President referred to the Soviet Foreign Minister as "dishonest and 
dishonorable."333 Diefenbaker, supported by Green, felt that there was nothing to be 
gained by personally insulting the Soviet politician.334 Merchant promised to relay that to 
the President, and, indeed, the President had the line removed from the final version of 
the speech.335 
Nonetheless, much of his initial displeasure — Diefenbaker's greeting to 
Merchant was described by an aide as "extremely cool"336 — was dispelled once he 
examined the U-2 photographs. Not only were the Canadians present amazed by the 
clarity, they were also intensely interested in the sequence of events that had led to the 
discovery. Merchant summarized the initial reports from spies in Cuba, as well as the 
noticeable increase in Soviet naval activity. Although Diefenbaker had been skeptical 
about how certain the Americans could truly be that the missiles were in place, he, along 
with Harkness and Green, were won over by the photos and the briefing given by a US 
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intelligence officer. 
Having been convinced, the men discussed what was to be done. Surprisingly, 
Green had little else to say.338 Harkness asked why the United States did not simply 
invade Cuba and destroy the missiles on the ground, a step that he felt would be less risky 
than engaging Soviet ships.339 Merchant assured him that that option had been 
considered. Harkness, knowledgeable and perceptive of military affairs, immediately saw 
a flaw in the blockade plan: he asked if Soviet submarines would be included in the 
blockade. When told that they would be, he expressed concern that any attempt by a US 
warship to stop and board a Soviet warship could provoke a world war.340 Merchant 
acknowledged the concern but stated that he was confident in the United States Navy's 
ability to effectively enforce the blockade. 
The meeting then ended. Merchant reported that he found Minister Green quite 
calm and surprisingly supportive of the President, and that Harkness was "cheered" by 
the strong, decisive show of American strength.341 The Prime Minister, however, refused 
to give a firm commitment of support for the United States, though Merchant wrote that 
the impression he had of the Prime Minister was of a man miffed by not having been 
personally consulted throughout the Crisis, but sufficiently impressed by the evidence 
presented to offer the United States strong support.342 This was in part due to the fact that 
while Canada had not joined in the trade embargo against Cuba, while still Ambassador 
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to Ottawa, Merchant had generally found Diefenbaker in agreement with relevant 
American policy.343 Merchant and the unnamed intelligence officer went to brief other 
Canadian political and military leaders, while Diefenbaker went home to dine and watch 
the President's televised address. 
After the President gave his famed speech, wherein he announced the blockade of 
offensive weapons to Cuba and threatened the Soviet Union with "a full retaliatory 
response" if any of the missiles in Cuba were launched, Opposition Leader Pearson 
telephoned Diefenbaker at home and asked him to return to the House to make a public 
statement.344 This caught Diefenbaker off guard. He had not been planning on doing so 
until the following morning's session, and was unprepared. Nonetheless, he felt he could 
not ignore a request from the Opposition Leader for a statement, and rushed to the House 
to give one. In doing so, he made a critical mistake. The only preparation he had received 
thus far was a memo written to him by Green for use in the private meeting with 
Ambassador Merchant.345 When the Prime Minister stood up in the House, he had only 
this memo and some of his own hastily scribbled notes to guide his remarks.346 
Furthermore, he had become increasingly troubled with the President's address; what had 
seemed to him to be reasonable on paper had, in the live delivery, struck Diefenbaker as 
ego-driven grandstanding, a reckless course of action that threatened to push the world 
into a nuclear war so that Kennedy could recapture prestige lost after the Bay of Pigs.347 
In his hasty ill temper, he erred badly, treating Green's private memo as a public 
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statement. After brief introductory remarks, standard political fluff about the need for 
calm and unity, the Prime Minister continued disastrously. Reading from Green's memo, 
he stated that a team from the United Nations was needed to go in to find an "objective" 
answer to whether or not there were indeed offensive missiles in Cuba.348 The Prime 
Minister hoped that such a mission would help "ascertain what the facts are."349 This 
suggested that Diefenbaker doubted the President. His remarks, as well as more 
supportive statements from Pearson, were immediately reported by the Embassy to the 
State Department. Diefenbaker quickly worsened an already terrible mistake when, 
while leaving the House, he remarked to reporters that soon, "the truth would be 
revealed."351 
In his memoirs, Diefenbaker is loath to accept any responsibility for this terrible 
error, and quickly skips past the whole incident with nary a mention of his fumble. 
Pearson's memoirs, however, tackle the issue directly, but generously. Pearson does not 
criticize Diefenbaker for his poor performance, instead suggesting that in the spur of the 
moment, anyone could have slipped up. Robinson is more defensive, stating that 
Diefenbaker was overwhelmed and simply erred because of how little warning he had 
had of the Crisis, an interpretation disproved by Nash's ultimate revelation that 
Diefenbaker had known far more than was generally appreciated. Denis Smith splits the 
difference, suggesting that Diefenbaker was indeed flustered and pushed into making a 
mistake, not by the events of the Crisis, but by Pearson's own statement of that evening, 
which forced Diefenbaker to immediately respond with one of his own, something he had 
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not intended to do, lest his opponent steal the spotlight on what was quickly shaping up to 
be an historic evening. This interpretation, that Diefenbaker was not ill-informed but 
simply caught off guard by the need for an immediate statement, is the most nuanced, and 
likely the best explanation for what otherwise would be an extremely rare error by a 
shrewd political veteran. 
Even in a White House that had come to expect nothing but trouble from the 
Canadian Prime Minister, Diefenbaker's remarks came as a shock. President Kennedy 
already strongly disliked Diefenbaker and considered him untrustworthy.352 Regardless, 
the President had been buoyed by Merchant's reports that Diefenbaker was "on side" 
with the President, and Kennedy specifically mentioned the "full support" of Canada to 
O C T 
reporters immediately after his famed speech. Diefenbaker, incensed by this perceived 
arrogant presumption, refused to order an RCAF alert, and indeed refused to take any 
action at all that night, abruptly rescheduling a Cabinet meeting until the following 
morning.354 Robert Kennedy said his brother was so affronted that his word would be 
questioned at such a time that this dislike crystallized into genuine hate.355 Canada's poor 
response was made to look worse by the hearty and immediate declarations of support 
from all other major US allies and many of the OAS members.356 Amidst an outpouring 
of support, Canada's silence was thunderous. 
At the next morning's Cabinet meeting, Diefenbaker was in a foul mood. 
Overnight, the United States military had stood up to DEFCON 3, and a formal request 
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had been made for the Canadian NORAD units to do the same so as to establish a 
prepared, unified continental air defence.357 Given Canada's lack of nuclear weapons, 
such a step would have amounted to largely symbolic support.358 Even so, the Cabinet 
meeting quickly bogged down on this issue, split between two camps. Harkness led one, 
and Green the other. 
This was not a new situation, as the men were fundamentally quite different. 
Harkness was a war hero, wounded in action while serving with the Royal Canadian 
Artillery in Europe during the Second World War.359 Since being made Minister of 
National Defence almost three years earlier, he had been a passionate supporter of the 
military, active in reaching out to the Canadian public to increase support for the armed 
forces.360 He was especially determined to see Canada accept nuclear weapons, not only 
for the obvious military reasons, but also because he knew for a fact that Canada had 
indeed committed to do so on several occasions.361 He had grown impatient with 
Diefenbaker's politically motivated procrastination. As the Minister in charge of 
military affairs, it was his responsibility to state to the public the Canadian position on the 
issue of adopting nuclear weapons, and he was becoming increasingly embittered by the 
necessity of his being forced to be the public face for a policy he found personally 
maddening.363 
His pro-American stance was why reports from the Embassy in Ottawa more than 
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once referred to him as America's "best friend" in Ottawa. Indeed, while in Ottawa for 
his trip, President Kennedy had managed to take Harkness aside for a brief, informal 
chat, where he pushed to know if Canada was ever going to accept nuclear weapons.364 
Harkness assured the President that Canada would, as soon as Diefenbaker could be 
convinced that accepting them was less politically risky than continued procrastination. 
He even went so far as to say publicly in the House that it was the policy of the 
Government to ensure that the Canadian military would never enter into a conflict armed 
with "inferior weapons."365 . 
Green, conversely, was ill suited for his post at External Affairs. He had never 
toured Europe, nor even visited Washington, DC. His main qualification for the job 
was that he was a close personal friend of the Prime Minister.367 Although a skilled 
parliamentarian, Green good-naturedly admitted that even his mother had expressed 
reservations about his posting to a portfolio that he knew so little about.368 Green was, 
however, considered by all, even the Americans he so often annoyed, to be a genuinely 
good man, charming and friendly, if a bit naive.369 
Green was passionate about nuclear disarmament.370 Horrified by radiation, he 
wished to see all bomb tests stopped and, eventually, total disarmament.371 Shrewd 
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enough to know that there was little Canada could do to sway the opinions of the 
superpowers, Green set about trying to remake Canada's foreign policies to turn the 
country into the leader of the so-called "middle powers."372 A US briefing memo on 
Green, prepared for Kennedy prior to their first meeting, while commenting upon his 
great personal character and genuine likeability, warned that his positions bordered on 
"neutralist."373 
These sentiments were repeated several months later after Green refused to join a 
meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany 
in Geneva so that he could spend more time developing his relationship with the 
representative from India.374 The Americans, at first attributing these actions to his 
inexperience, were reluctantly forced to concede that he was, in fact, simply hostile 
(albeit politely) to the interests of the United States.375 Further such examples led 
Kennedy in October of 1961 to write Diefenbaker a surprisingly blunt letter lamenting 
Canada's "abandoning the Western position" and warning that such actions threatened to 
"damage seriously" relations between Canada and the United States.376 
The day after Kennedy's speech to the world, the Cabinet was leaning towards 
Harkness' position. Green, however, made an impassioned speech that swayed 
Diefenbaker enough to convince him to delay further action. The Cabinet meeting 
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minutes offer a fascinating glimpse into the conversation. Though still partially redacted, 
two full pages are given over to summarizing the principle points of the argument: 
Canada, while not politically obligated to march in lockstep with the United States was in 
a very real practical sense forced to do so, but a Canadian decision to go to DEFCON 3 
could be interpreted as Canada having been "stampeded" by the United States.377 
Ultimately, the minutes remark blandly "further consideration would be given to the 
alerting of the Canadian air defence forces after the reactions of other countries, 
particularly the UK.. .had been ascertained."378 It is ironic that a Prime Minister so 
sensitive to undue influence from the United States would wait on the word of Britain. 
For Harkness, this was unacceptable. As early as the night before, he had quietly 
put the military on alert without a formal announcement.379 His authority to do this was 
murky at best. The government's War Book, which specified exactly the proper to steps 
in such an emergency, was in the midst of being revised and updated.380 
Incomprehensibly, however, the previous War Book had been ordered cancelled before 
the new one had been issued, meaning that there was no overall Canadian defence plan. 
Local commanders had authority to respond to direct threats, but otherwise, the Canadian 
•JQ 1 
military leadership was frozen. This would have been bad enough even with a 
proactive, unified Cabinet. As the case was, Cabinet was polarized between Green and 
Harkness and the Prime Minister, furious with Kennedy, went beyond merely hesitation, 
and into outright deliberate delay. 
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Whether or not Diefenbaker knew of Harkness' alert is a matter of debate. In his 
memoirs, Diefenbaker makes no mention of any alerts being issued. Robinson, however, 
believed it unlikely that a politician as shrewd and well connected as Diefenbaker could 
possibly have missed the scurrying of his officers to make ready for war. This conclusion 
is shared by Nash, who feels that Diefenbaker chose to let it go on without comment out 
of genuine concern of Soviet attack, and by Haydon, who does not believe that the flurry 
of reports and supply requisitions that suddenly poured in from the Navy's Atlantic 
squadrons could possibly have gone unnoticed in Ottawa. Unfortunately, no document 
has yet emerged to settle this issue definitively either way, leaving all such discussion 
stranded in the realm of pure speculation. 
The Prime Minister and the President spoke briefly by telephone on Tuesday, 
October 23rd, and the conversation — predictably — did not go well.382 Kennedy 
repeatedly asked for Canada to stand-to to DEFCON 3, and in each case, Diefenbaker 
evaded. He demanded to know when Canada had been consulted, as Kennedy had 
promised to do at the Ottawa meeting. The frustrated Kennedy responded dismissively, 
saying simply, "You weren't." Diefenbaker's secretary later retold how upset 
Diefenbaker was after that telephone conversation, convinced that Kennedy would drag 
the world into a nuclear war. "He wants the Russians out of there, and then they'll bomb 
us," he complained. He also began to muse to aides and confidants that in the missile age, 
there might not be enough early warning to evacuate to the government's bunker in 
Arnprior, outside of Ottawa. 
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The next day's Cabinet meeting went no better. Harkness was able to get 
agreement for a suspension of a planned troop rotation in Europe, leaving the trained men 
at their posts within NATO, while also making arrangements for the families of any man 
stationed in Europe to be voluntarily evacuated back to Canada.385 After this, agreement 
was reached on the denial of overflight privileges to Soviet planes wishing to refuel in 
Canada on the way to Cuba, and that all other Eastern Bloc flights would be searched 
before being permitted to continue on their way.386 When the topic of discussion returned 
once again to the topic of raising the Canadian military's alert level, the meeting 
devolved into an angry shouting match.387 The minutes of the meeting record that while 
some argued that Harkness should immediately announce an alert, others felt it was not 
necessary at that time, and might even make the Crisis worse.388 Once again, Cabinet 
deferred, and the minutes record only that, "The Cabinet agreed to give further 
consideration, at its next meeting, to the question whether any change is required in the 
state of readiness of the Canadian forces."389 
Resolution to the issue was abruptly forced. While Cabinet was meeting, General 
Power, commander of the American Strategic Air Command, ordered an increase in the 
alert status to DEFCON 2, or, "enemy attack imminent."390 Legally, such an increase was 
within Power's operational mandate. Politically, however, it was a recklessly provocative 
move; eighty B-52s roared into the skies and began orbiting their "fail-safe" positions 
finally ended, perhaps Canada's only decisive action was this stockpiling of smooth single malt liquor and 
the finest gin with which Cabinet would have passed the time while waiting for the radioactive fallout to 
decay to safe levels. 
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just outside of Soviet territory.391 In Ottawa, Harkness received this news with near panic, 
taking it to mean that something had happened that he did not know about. He rushed to 
Diefenbaker's office and desperately pleaded with the Prime Minister to order DEFCON 
3 for Canada. To his surprise, the exasperated Prime Minister agreed with a dismissive 
wave. After all of the acrimony of the last two days, Canada was indeed pushed into a 
military alert by an American action, and Cabinet did not make the ultimate decision, 
after all. 
Though the formal declaration of DEFCON 3 — known in Canada as a state of 
"Military Vigilance" — was two days in coming, the military had not wasted time. 
Acting on Harkness' orders, the military commanders had done everything within their 
limited mandate to move the Canadian military onto a war footing. At times, the steps 
taken were almost ridiculous; one Canadian air force officer, frustrated by the delay in 
the DEFCON 3 alert, simply ordered a surprise training exercise simulating a DEFCON 3 
alert.393 Other squadron commanders followed suit, with a Canadian squadron even 
deploying to Florida, where they took part in preparations to bomb Cuba.394 For training 
purposes only, of course. 
Other Canadian air force officers, seeing that their American colleagues in 
NORAD had gone to DEFCON 3, got around their inability to order DEFCON 3 by 
issuing a series of individual orders that accomplished the same things the formal alert 
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summarized as a fixed geographical point where US bombers would orbit in wait for orders to attack. Since 
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would have. In this manner, NORAD continued to function effectively, with both air 
forces at a state of readiness equivalent to the alert, whether that alert was formal or 
improvised. At no time, however, were the BOMARC missiles or the Voodoos armed 
with nuclear warheads, meaning that even the improvised state of alert was a mainly 
symbolic gesture of solidarity. The National Early Warning System was activated, but 
this was a similarly pointless gesture; Canada had not undertaken any significant civil 
defence preparations, making early warning somewhat pointless.397 
So while the Royal Canadian Air Force took what few steps they could, it made 
little practical difference. Likewise, the Canadian Army also stood up to a maximum 
alert, but without political approval, few concrete steps could be taken.398 Plans were 
drafted to deploy troops to Europe in case the Soviets invaded there, and what few civil 
defence units that existed were sent into the field, presumably to enjoy better views of the 
mushroom clouds going up over Toronto and Montreal.399 
The Royal Canadian Navy, however, was in a position to intervene decisively in 
the Crisis, and did so gladly. Ironically, while the Air Force and Army commanders 
moved quickly to go to alert even without political authority, Naval Headquarters 
dragged their feet in giving orders to Rear Admiral Dyer, commander of the Canadian 
Atlantic Fleet. Frustrated by Ottawa's lack of clear instructions, Dyer cleverly seized an 
early opportunity to order an alert on his own authority. On October 23rd, while the first 
Cabinet meeting was ending inconclusively, an RCAF maritime patrol aircraft on a 
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routine training mission spotted a Soviet submarine running on the surface unusually 
close to the Canadian coast.400 Dyer seized upon this as a reason to order his ships to sea 
under the guise of determining if there were any other submarines lurking near Canadian 
. 401 
waters. 
Dyer was fortunate: the Crisis had begun amidst a major exercise between the 
American and Canadian fleets.402 Already, the Navy's warships and Air Force's patrol 
aircraft were at a high state of readiness, and most were already deployed right where 
they were needed. One notable exception was Canada's only aircraft carrier, the HMCS 
Bonaventure, and her handful of escorts. Their role in the exercise had them deployed 
closer to Europe than North America, far too distant to be of immediate use; Dyer 
immediately ordered her recalled.403 Dyer also had the benefit of numerous prearranged 
agreements between his headquarters in Halifax and the American Atlantic Fleet 
headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, that allowed the two forces to operate effectively as 
one unit, with a constant flow of classified plans and intelligence reports moving between 
the two commands automatically.404 It is ironic that the air forces, with a unified 
headquarters, were not able to operate as effectively as Dyer and his American 
counterpart, Vice Admiral Taylor. The personal relationship between these two men, 
good friends and trusted confidants, was worth more than the entire NORAD apparatus. 
Responsibilities were quickly agreed upon, patrols plotted, and both fleets went to work. 
As a precaution, Dyer and his staff evacuated Halifax, deemed a likely target for a 
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Soviet nuclear strike.405 This created some headaches until the chain of command could 
be reestablished, and hindered his efforts to browbeat Ottawa into releasing needed fuel 
and provisions.406 While Dyer was pushing Harkness' personal approval to the very limit, 
Ottawa's inability to release to him additional support threatened to hinder his efforts. 
This was particularly problematic with his patrol aircraft, which actually belonged to the 
Air Force.407 Dyer's ability to sustain his operation depended in large part on his ability 
to count on those aircraft, and even while he pushed his ships to sea, the Air Force staff in 
Ottawa were jealousy hoarding their fuel supplies, causing problems for Dyer. 
Despite the efforts of Harkness and Dyer, the Canadian media soon realized that 
Canada's support of the United States was muted at best. The Globe and Mail, benefiting 
from several well-timed leaks from frustrated military officers, wrote a devastating 
editorial attacking Diefenbaker for his half-hearted support of President Kennedy. It said 
his attempt to sit on the fence and avoid a direct commitment of support was a "rebuke" 
to the United States, which in this time of crisis was "unthinkable."408 Likewise, The New 
York Times attacked Diefenbaker for his long delay in authorizing what it quite correctly 
deemed an entirely appropriate increase in Canada's NORAD squadron's alert state.409 
Desperate to turn things around, Diefenbaker had Green give a televised interview to 
state Canada's steps thus far. It was a disaster. Green was clearly uncomfortable 
expressing any support of the United States, even during an interview whose purpose was 
Royal Canadian Navy Signals Document 1, October 24th, 1962. From Haydon, 240. 
Royal Canadian Navy Signals Document 7, October 26th, 1962. From Haydon, 247. It is these repeated 
requests for more fuel that would have made it difficult for the Navy's dramatically increased operational 
tempo to go unnoticed in Ottawa, though whether or not such observations were reported up the chain of 
command to Diefenbaker or handled by clerical personnel at Naval HQ is not known. 
407
 Ibid. 
408
 Haydon, 130. 
4 0 9
 Ibid, 125. 
94 
to express support of the United States. The reporters present quickly perceived his 
obvious reluctance and pounced on him, pushing him into a corner with repeated sharp 
questioning. Finally, Green, trapped, said testily, "We are friends of the United States and 
we are standing beside her."410 No one bought it. 
The next day in the House, the Tories were hammered by the Liberal opposition 
for their failure to communicate a clear policy. Pearson stood up in the House and made a 
strong statement of support for President Kennedy's actions and tore into Diefenbaker's 
indecisiveness. Diefenbaker rose in response and read a list of Canada's contributions, 
claiming to be firmly in agreement with the United State and "other allies."411 This 
speech was the first formal announcement of Canada's Military Vigilance alert, thus 
making firm Canadian military support for the United States official after a devastating 
delay of three days.412 
On the same Thursday that Diefenbaker announced that Canada was at alert, 
American Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, representative to the United Nations, scored a 
major propaganda victory against Soviet Ambassador Zorin when he showed pictures to 
the Security Council of the Soviet missiles sites in Cuba.413 In Moscow, an increasingly 
worried Khrushchev began to back off from his prior aggressive rhetoric, with the state-
run newspaper Pravda calling for reason and rationality to avoid war.414 
In the waters off Cuba, the United States staged a largely symbolic boarding of a 
Soviet-chartered ship; the officers who went aboard politely examined the manifests, 
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enjoyed a cup of coffee with the crew, and sailed back to their destroyer, having given the 
ship their blessing to continue. 15 This companionable encounter at sea was in contrast to 
the alarm felt by Pentagon war planners and CIA analysts, who were updating their 
estimates of Soviet military strength on the ground in Cuba to include suspected FROG 
missiles, short-range rockets armed with tactical nuclear weapons.416 They were, in the 
words of CIA Director John McCone, "Very evil stuff," and seriously threatened the 
success of any contemplated invasion.417 
Fearful of what a nuclear war would mean for the Soviet Union, Khrushchev 
> 
cabled to President Kennedy a rambling, sentimental letter on Friday evening, Moscow 
time.418 In it, he offered to withdraw "military specialists" from Cuba if Kennedy would 
offer a public pledge to not invade Cuba, or assist others in the same enterprise. Coding 
delays prevented it from being delivered to President Kennedy until late Friday evening, 
Washington time.419 Kennedy was sleeping. On Saturday morning, Washington time, 
Khrushchev bowed to pressure from hardliners and sent a second letter, this time insisting 
that the missiles would only be withdrawn from Cuba if America withdrew its missiles 
from Turkey.420 Kennedy awoke to find two letters from the Soviet leadership, saying 
different things. This created much confusion and fear inside the Pentagon, where a coup 
was suspected to have taken place in Moscow. 
The second letter also promised the United States that the Soviet Union had full 
control of its military forces in Cuba, and that there would be no accidental escalation. 
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Events soon gave lie to this promise. American planes carried out unusually low-level 
photographic flights, trying to determine if the missiles were operational.421 Castro, in a 
state of near nervous collapse, ordered the planes shot down.422 Several were hit. The 
situation was set to soon worsen: the commanders of a Soviet surface-to-air missile 
battery, through a communications glitch, lost contact with their superiors, and heard 
only the Cuban orders to fire.423 Fearing the worst, they launched missiles at the only 
American aircraft in range, a U-2 plane on a reconnaissance mission. Two missiles struck 
the plane, destroying it and killing the pilot, Major Rudolph Anderson.424 Meanwhile, an 
American destroyer fired several warning shots at a Soviet submarine, whose enraged 
captain ordered the firing of a nuclear-tipped torpedo. After his crew refused this order, 
the captain settled for surfacing his sub and offering the American crew a universally 
recognized gesture.425 
At the same time that Major Anderson's plane was crashing in the Cuban jungle 
and Soviet and American naval personnel were cursing each other, another U-2 suffered a 
navigational error and strayed over Siberia. Soviet fighters were scrambled to intercept it 
and were chased off by American fighters sent from Alaska.426 Secretary McNamara, 
normally one of Kennedy's most pragmatic, level-headed advisors, flew into a rage when 
informed of these near-simultaneous events, and urged the President to launch a massive 
air attack on Cuba immediately.427 Given Khrushchev's assurances of only several hours 
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before that he had full control of his military, McNamara viewed these actions as 
deliberate, calculated provocations. 
McNamara soon calmed himself and withdrew his recommendation to attack, but 
Kennedy was left deeply shaken. America was poorly prepared to endure a nuclear 
attack; the Office of Civil Defense was undermanned and short on funds.428 Most 
Americans faced the Crisis with calm, but localized incidences of panic did empty some 
grocery stores of canned goods and gun stores of high-powered firearms and 
ammunition.4 9 Some fled their homes, many more built fallout shelters in their 
backyards and basements. Hearing this, Kennedy commented to advisors that after a 
nuclear war, the Soviet demand to remove the missiles from Turkey might be viewed by 
the survivors as "a good proposition."430 
Seeking a resolution, Kennedy dispatched his brother Robert to meet with 
Ambassador Dobrynin, the Soviets' top diplomat in Washington. Robert Kennedy 
informed the Ambassador that the United States was prepared to publicly accept the 
terms of the Soviet Union's first offer for a resolution, and would agree also to remove 
the Jupiter missiles from Turkey in several months time, provided the Soviets kept that 
guarantee secret.431 This would allow both Kennedy and Khrushchev to claim victories: 
the Soviets would have pressured the Americans into offering a no-invasion pledge, and 
America would have forced them to remove the missiles. Khrushchev, as fearful of war 
as Kennedy, accepted this offer immediately. The Cuban Missile Crisis thus ended anti-
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climactically, as both sides heaved great signs of relief and pulled back from the brink.432 
The threat of imminent war was over. 
Though he did not know it, so was Diefenbaker's career as Prime Minister. His 
government's shaky handling of the Crisis had eroded his public support and incensed the 
opposition. On 3 January 1963, General Norstad, an American on a farewell tour of 
NATO countries to mark his retirement as Supreme Allied Commander, gave a press 
conference wherein he stated bluntly that without nuclear weapons, Canada's BOMARC 
missiles and F-104 fighter jets were near useless. Capitalizing on this opportunity and the 
pro-American sentiment instilled by Kennedy's strong actions in the Crisis, on 13 
January 1963, Liberal leader Pearson gave a speech reversing his party's stance on 
nuclear weapons, saying that Canada would accept atomic ammunition without delay.433 
The speech was well received, and Pearson himself would later recall that it was his 
proudest political moment.434 The tensions within Diefenbaker's Cabinet regarding 
nuclear weapons for Canada finally broke into the open. On the defensive, Diefenbaker 
stood up in the House on 21 and 25 January to deny General Norstad's claims and insist 
that Canada had lived up to all of its agreements with the United States and NATO.435 
This was too much for the United States. Calling Diefenbaker's statements "a 
masterpiece [of] deception and persuasion," Walton Butterworth, Livingston Merchant's 
successor as Washington's Ambassador to Canada, urged a strong, and public, response 
by the State Department. 436 This came on 30 January, and in plain language refuted 
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Diefenbaker's claims, essentially accusing him of lying. Diefenbaker reacted 
predictably, calling this an intrusion into Canadian affairs. Not every Canadian agreed: an 
amusing document in the Kennedy Library archives, with the hand written title of "One 
Firm Vote", records a telephone call to the State Department from Ms. Margaret 
Knowles, of Toronto, who telephoned to say, 
.. .how upset she was by reading in Canadian papers that Americans were 
meddling in Canadian affairs. She said she didn't believe a word of it, and 
knew that as soon as trouble started, Canadians would be begging for 
protection from the US. She continued with assorted criticisms of the 
present Canadian administration and then observed how lamentable it was 
that there were not more Kennedys [sic] around so that Canada could have 
some, too. Earlier in the conversation, Mrs. Knowles had acknowledged 
that she was Irish. 
The American release was devastating to the Conservatives. Harkness resigned 
his post as Minister of National Defence immediately, and Pearson called a vote of non-
confidence in Diefenbaker on 4 February.439 The vote, held next day, saw Diefenbaker's 
government soundly defeated.440 Diefenbaker immediately launched an anti-American 
campaign, portraying Pearson as a Kennedy stooge and himself as the only true defender 
of Canadian sovereignty, even going so far as to leak to the press the existence of the 
Rostow Memorandum, though he did not release it.441 Pearson's own campaign was 
poorly run from the start, and his massive lead in the polls quickly evaporated.442 The 
campaign was marked by vicious personal attacks by Conservatives upon Pearson, 
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leaving his wife in tears after one rally. 
Diefenbaker's strong attacks, combined with the ineffective Liberal campaign and 
unfortunate comments by McNamara, where he called Canada's BOMARCs useful as 
decoys for Soviet bombs, reversed the Tory's sliding fortunes enough to hold Pearson to 
a minority government. Even so, Diefenbaker would never recover from this defeat. 
Though he continued to serve in Parliament until his death in 1979, he looked back upon 
the 1963 election with bitterness, writing in his memoirs that the Liberals, ".. .seemed to 
mistake this country for the United States." Pearson's victory promised to begin a new 
era in Canadian politics; his friendship with Kennedy could not have been more different 
than the loathing mutually shared between the President and Diefenbaker. Tragically, 
there was little time to reap the benefits of their bond: President Kennedy was cut down 
by assassin's bullets in Dallas on 22 November 1963, and Pearson and Johnson, while 
sharing a friendly, amicable relationship, were never as close as Pearson had been to 
Kennedy.445 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the evolving relationship between President John Kennedy and 
Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, and how their eventually intense personal dislike 
contributed to a lackluster response by the Canadian Prime Minister to the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. The understanding of this weighty matter has evolved considerably over two 
generations of Canadian scholarship while being virtually ignored by American 
historians. 
In the final analysis, the Canadian military did virtually all that it could do to 
make itself ready for war despite the leadership vacuum that existed in Ottawa. Whether 
on the personal initiative of Air Force squadron commanders or Admiral Dyer's creative 
use of his operational authority, the various branches of the Canadian armed forces 
prepared to do battle with the Soviet Union in a war that might well have ended with 
Canada virtually annihilated. Both the Navy and the Air Force were quick to respond 
with whatever units were available, and worked closely with the United States to help 
patrol the North Atlantic, and thereby indirectly support the blockade of Cuba. These 
actions took place while Diefenbaker's Cabinet was still debating what form the 
Canadian response should take. While this brings into question to extent to which the 
Canadian government had control over its own forces, the sailors and airmen who rushed 
into action faster than Ottawa could respond were operating within pre-existing, and pre-
approved, orders for bi-lateral cooperation with the United States military. While 
Canadian policymakers had likely never anticipated the military engaging in defensive 
operations on its own authority, such was the reality of the thermonuclear missile era -
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actions had to be taken in minutes, for minutes might be all that there was. 
The Canadian troops, airmen, and sailors, however, were armed with ineffective 
weapons, and even if fully committed and positioned in the right place to make a 
difference, would have been in no position to intervene decisively in a Cuban Missile 
War. Had the shooting started, on the assumption that Diefenbaker would have then been 
able to stave off an understandable bout of panic and order the Canadian military into 
battle, Canadian ships and planes would have had mere hours to attempt to load nuclear 
weapons, or race into battle with far less effective conventional munitions. Some 
victories would have been scored by Canadian units despite inferior armaments, and 
perhaps a handful of Canadian planes and warships would have had time to take on 
American nuclear weapons (as discussed, some are rumoured to have been close to doing 
exactly this). Of course, this all might be yet another variation on the old story about the 
time traveler who rearranges the Titanic's deck chairs: in a civilization-destroying 
nuclear war, perhaps it does not matter what unit fired which bomb. The millions of dead 
would not care one way or the other. 
Given all the above, it could be fairly asked what difference Canada's actions or 
inactions could possibly have made in the unfolding of the Crisis. Had the worst come to 
pass, it can be conceded that it would have made little difference at all. Given the 
correlation of forces in 1962, it can be safely assumed that a Cuban Missile War would 
have left Cuba and the Soviet Union utterly destroyed, and America intact but reeling 
under a greater death toll in one day than she had endured in all her prior wars combined. 
In such a nightmare scenario, with America's "full retaliatory response" having cremated 
the Soviet Union and President Kennedy or a successor coping with pulverized cities and 
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bases, what Canada had or had not done would have seemed a point of limited 
importance. The issue here is not whether or not a tree falling in the forest when no one is 
around makes a sound, but whether the sound of a single small tree falling matters when 
the entire forest is burning. 
Of course, the above deals with counter-factuals and hypotheses. As it happened, 
the Cuban Missile Crisis was successfully resolved, and a very much un-atomized 
Kennedy Administration had plenty of time to take stock of how the various participants 
had responded. Despite the valiant efforts of the Canadian military to prepare for battle, 
and the very real contributions made by Canadian military personnel to the naval ocean-
based aspects of the Crisis, Kennedy and his closest confidants could not help but take 
note of the near total silence during the height of the Crisis from one of their closest 
allies. Neither country was entirely in the right, but President Kennedy and his most 
trusted advisors — already predisposed to dislike Diefenbaker due to his constant 
procrastination —justifiably felt betrayed. The prompt and effective help of the 
Canadian Navy and Air Force in monitoring Soviet shipping and submarine activity was, 
unfairly, overlooked by a Kennedy Administration that had turned to Canada expecting a 
loud, enthusiastic display of public support, and was instead faced with deafening silence. 
Is it proper that America should overlook the quick and efficient help of Canadian airmen 
and sailors? Of course not. Likewise, it was improper of Kennedy to assume that Canada 
would do his bidding as soon as he deigned to ask for help, without first having gone 
through the bother of keeping Canadian officials fully up-to-date, as they had a right to 
expect given the various treaties and agreements between the two governments. 
In that sense, America had failed to live up to its obligations. Diefenbaker was 
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understandably hurt by the lack of consultation, what he interpreted as a personal slight, 
and spent far too long nursing his own bruised ego while failing to take steps necessary to 
ensure continental security. For the Americans, it was never about Diefenbaker's 
sensibilities or Canadian nationalism, but the need to maintain operational secrecy in a 
period of extreme danger. Both governments could have done better, and both men 
allowed their mutual dislike to colour their exchanges. 
Of the two, however, President Kennedy has the advantage of being able to claim 
that his actions were motivated by operational security, and an ultimately broken trust 
that Canada would automatically honour her agreements. The reality, of course, is that 
the American president never let any thought of Canada's feelings or his promise to John 
Diefenbaker enter into his mind while plotting the best course to ensure America's 
physical survival and continued international prestige. John Diefenbaker has no such 
noble intentions to hide behind. While the earliest Canadian scholars gave him too little 
credit when they bemusedly asked him why he had done nothing, the more recent 
scholarship has hardly vindicated him. While it is true that Canadian sovereignty was not 
America's primary concern, his actions before, during and after the Crisis prove that he 
had no greater motivation behind his constant provocations of Kennedy. It is 
disheartening to consider that a mature man, a seasoned politician, could be so petty as to 
put off ordering a military alert simply to express his displeasure. Yet given what we now 
know — that Diefenbaker knew in advance of the Crisis, and was still more concerned 
with standing up to Kennedy than presenting the Soviet Union with a united allied front 
— no other conclusion is credible. 
In the end, of course, Diefenbaker's regrettable personal failings mattered to the 
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Cubans and Soviets not a whit. Nothing Canada did or failed to do made the Crisis any 
more dangerous. But for Canadian-American relations, the consequences could well have 
proven disastrous had Diefenbaker and Kennedy had further opportunity to continue 
poisoning the well of goodwill that generations of military, cultural and economic ties 
had created. It is a bitter truth that the swift electoral defeat of Diefenbaker post-Crisis, 
and the tragic assassination of President Kennedy, did more to salvage the alliance 
between Canada and the United States by ushering in new leadership than either leader 
likely would have done of their own accord. The relationship between Pearson and 
Johnson was never particularly close, but it gave the much-relieved diplomats and 
bureaucrats a chance to build the ever-deeper ties between the two nations in an 
environment free of the toxic feelings between two proud and stubborn leaders. 
To be sure, the future of Canadian-American relations would not be smooth 
sailing from that day forth. Johnson allegedly physically grabbed Pearson after the latter 
publicly called for a halt to US bombing of North Vietnam, and Pierre Trudeau's tenure 
as Prime Minister, including his rejection of nuclear weapons for exactly the reasons 
Green had previously advocated, seemed almost tailor-made to antagonize Richard 
Nixon. All the same, never again were the personal clashes of politicians ever as relevant 
to the conduct of the bi-lateral relationship, nor were they such poorly guarded secrets as 
the feud between Kennedy and Diefenbaker. Squabbling over Vietnam, troops for 
NATO, nuclear weapons and anti-nuclear-weapons weapons, and the status of communist 
China continued to rankle officials on both sides of the border. Through it all, the two 
militaries worked ever closer together, tourism continued unabated, the Auto Pact took 
the nations one large step closer to truly free trade, and the slow blurring of the border 
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continued. Though never tested to the extent it was in the fall of 1962, the bi-lateral 
relationship has remained strong.446 
During those frightful days in October of 1962, the Canadian military stretched 
every definition to the maximum, and bent every rule to the breaking point, to put itself in 
a position to assist their much larger allies in the dreadful battle they feared was 
approaching. It is a terrible shame that all their hard work would not have mattered as 
much as a few token words of moral support spoken by Prime Minister Diefenbaker, and 
that the lack of such superficial assurances should have come to define Canada's 
response to the Crisis in the eyes of the United States. The personal relationship between 
John Diefenbaker and John Kennedy, well-studied in Canada by successive waves of 
scholarship, came close to poisoning the bi-lateral relationship between the two nations, 
and officials and officers on both sides of the border had to scramble under the flimsiest 
of pretexts to make up for the lack of decisive, productive leadership at the very top. The 
extent to which they were successful, and the continuing good will between the two 
nations despite occasional personality clashes amongst strong egos and serious political 
issues, is a testament to the long-standing, and perhaps unstoppable, drift of Canada and 
the United States towards ever-greater integration. 
446 
During a recent private conversation with a former Canadian government official, speaking off the 
record, this writer was told that contrary to popular opinion and despite their obvious political differences, 
Jean Chretien and George W. Bush were quite fond of each other, as were their respective wives, though 
President Bush was less enthusiastic about Paul Martin. 
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